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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea has been significantly 
affected by problems associated with the border between them. This has not been a 
dispute about the boundary itself. There is a line on the map which the two countries 
have agreed to accept Rather, the border problem which has arisen between the two 
countries concerns an independence movement called the ‘Organisasi Papua Merdeka’ 
(Free Papua Movement - OPM) which since 1963 has been active against Indonesia and 
has repeatedly crossed the border to seek refuge in neighbouring Papua New Guinea; 
incursions in Papua New Guinea by the Indonesian military in pursuit of the OPM; and 
thousands of Irian Jayan refugees who have crossed the border to seek sanctuary in 
Papua New Guinea.
Since Papua New Guinea’s independence in 1975 the border problem has intensified, 
especially in 1984 when an uprising in Jayapura resulted in an influx of 12,(XX) refugees 
into Papua New Guinea territory. This heightened security concerns in the two 
countries. For Jakarta, the refugees could become bases for the OPM to threaten 
Indonesia’s security; for Papua New Guinea on the other hand, there were concerns 
about possible Indonesian border incursions in an attempt to destroy the OPM.
The border problems have given rise to considerable tensions between the two countries, 
because both have accused and have been suspicious of each other which could lead to 
further escalation to the point of open conflict This, in turn, could invite Australia’s 
involvement in view of her relationship with Papua New Guinea. Therefore the border 
problem is a very important in the Indonesia and Papua New Guinea relationship. The 
border situation could threaten not only security and stability between the two
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countries, but also, the South West Pacific Region.
So far Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have maintained a good relationship and the 
escalation of the border tensions ha> been avoided. This is because there have been 
some efforts made by the two countries to reduce border tensions with regard to the 
OPM, the refugees, and the border incursions.
The main purpose of this subthesis is to evaluate the various approaches or measures 
that these two countries have attempted in fostering mutual understanding and trust, and 
to prevent further escalation of border tension. Most importantly, the thesis seeks to 
evaluate strategies in terms of how, and to what extent, they deal with the causes of the 
problem. Thus, much of the thesis is concerned with establishing the causes of the 
problem against which the tension-reducing measures can be judged.
The border problems between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have attracted the 
attention of many scholars. There have been studies such as that of Paul W. Van der 
Veur which concentrate on the history of the New Guinea border.1 Other studies, for 
example, that of Nyamekye and Premdas, analysed Indonesian and Papua New Guinean 
policies, interests, and views concerning the border problems.2 Further, there have been 
many studies which dealt with particular aspects of the border problem. Loekman 
Soetrisno, for example, has observed the unintended effects of the ‘Transmigrasi’ 
Program on the local people in Irian Jaya. This program has given rise to hostility 
among the Melanesian people.3 Other studies have concentrated on Indonesian
^aul W. Van der Veur, Search for New Guinea's Boundaries, from Torres Straits to the Pacific 
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1966), especially Chapter 5.
2Kwasi Nyamekye and Ralph R. Premdas, "Papua New Guinea-Indonesia Relations over Irian Jaya", 
Pacific Perspective. Vol.8, No.2 (1979).
3Loekman Soetrisno, "The Problematic Role of Transmigration in Irian Jaya", 
and Society Supplement, trans. by Beverly Blaskett, No.19 (December, 1986).
2
development policy in Irian Jaya. For example, Ross Gamaut and Chris Manning have 
described the effect on Irian Jaya of immigrants, the lack of unskilled personnel, and the 
difficulties in developing the highland areas.1 The rise of the OPM - its origins, its 
strengths and weaknesses - have been studied by many scholars.2 Alan Smith and 
Kevin Hewison examined the particular uprising of the OPM in Jayapura in 1984 which 
caused the outpouring of refugees as mentioned above.3 There are only a few scholars, 
however, who have attempted to examine in detail some approaches to reduce the 
tensions associated with border problems. There are some scholars who have analysed 
some of these approaches as a part of a broader study and some have attempted to 
explore particular approaches, for example, Papua New Guinea’s possible membership of 
ASEAN.4 There have also been bilateral scholarly seminars about the Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea border problems.5
The subthesis is structured around four chapters. Chapter 1 explores the history and the 
nature of the border problem. Chapter 2 examines the causes of border tensions which 
can be said to emanate from Indonesian policies or from developments on the 
Indonesian side of the border. Chapter 3, on the other hand, focuses on, the causes of 
border tensions which result from developments on the Papua New Guinea side of the 
border. In the final chapter, Chapter 4, the various tension-reducing measures attempted 
by Papua New Guinea and Indonesia are evaluated.
^ o s s  Gamaut and Chris Manning, Irian Java, the Transformation of a Melanesian Economy. (Canberra: 
A.N.U. Press, 1974).
R em das and Nyamekye, "Papua New Guinea 1978: Year of the OPM", Asian Survey. VoL19, N o.l 
(January, 1979).
3Alan Smith and Kevin Hewison, "1984 - The Year OPM Pulled the Plug on Indonesia - Papua New 
Guinea Relations", Catalyst. VoL15, No.2 (1985).
^ e v in  Hewison, Alan Smith and N. Bardu, "The Papua New Guinea and Membership of ASEAN", 
Australian Outlook. Vol.39, No.3 (December, 1985).
5Edward P. Wolfers (ed.), Bevond the Border (Waigani: The University of Papua New Guinea and The 
Institute of Pacific Studies University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1986).
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CHAPTER 1
THE BORDER PROBLEM
1.1 BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Before examining the problems associated with the Indonesian/Papua New Guinea 
Border, it is useful to look briefly at the problem of borders in international relations in 
general. In order to prevent confusion of geographical terms, it is necessary to 
distinguish between ‘boundary’, ’frontier’ or ’border’ and border. According to 
Cukwurah: "A ‘boundary’ denotes a line whereas a ‘frontier’ is more property a region 
or zone having width as well as length and, therefore, merely indicates, without fixing the 
exact limit, where one state ends and another begins." Weigert and Pearcy described 
‘frontier’ as the area adjacent to the boundary. " 1 Holdich went a little further and 
observed that "no limit is set to a frontier until an actual line or boundary is defined by 
treaty...''2 Further, Prescott defined a boundary as "a line and a border is a zone in 
which a boundary is located."2
It is clear "a boundary is a line" whereas "frontier" and "border" denote a zone in 
which a boundary is defined. However, in many cases the words ‘boundary’, ‘frontier’
Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company
1965), p.34.
^ .H . Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundaries Making (London, 1916) as cited by Cukwurah, The 
Settlement, p.12.
^Prescott, "Problems o f International Boundaries, with Particular Reference to the Boundary Between 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea", in Between Two Nations, ed. R-J. May (Bathurst: Robert Brown and 
Associates (Aust.) Pty. Ltd., 1986): p.l; see also idem. Boundaries and Frontiers (London: Crown Helm Ltd, 
1978), p.90.
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and ‘border’ are still used interchangeably as if they are synonymous.1 Throughout this 
subthesis, the terms boundary, frontier or border are used in the following sense: 
‘frontier’ or ‘border’ refers to a zone, and ‘boundary’ refers to a line.
There are several kinds of disputes over boundaries. Prescott described the four distinct 
kinds of boundary disputes as follows:
1. Territorial boundary disputes occur when one country wants to claim part of the 
territory of another country. For example, Somalia’s claim to the Haud and 
Ogaden areas of Ethiopia.
2. Positional boundary disputes occur when one country does not agree with the 
boundary demarcation which has already been defined in a treaty. For example, 
the disagreement between China and Russia over the course of their boundary in 
the vicinity of the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers.
3. Functional boundary disputes occur when one country considers that its 
neighbour has affected its activities along the boundary. For example, Tanzania 
has prevented Kenyan lorries from operating between Kenya and Zambia along 
the roads through the west of Tanzania.
4. Resources boundary disputes occur when two countries have disagreed over "the 
use o f some trans-boundary resources", such as a river or a Coalfield\ For 
example India and Bangladesh have quarrelled over the diversion of the Gangas 
Waters at the Farraka Barrage.2.
:For greater detail see Cukwurah. The Settlement, p . l l .  
^ e sc o tt, "Problem", p2  and 11.
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Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problems do not fall under any of these 
categories. It is not a territorial boundary dispute, because the Agreement of 1973 has 
fixed the boundary in a clear manner which does not allow any territorial claims (see 
Appendix I). Prescott argues that "there does not appear to be any likely territorial 
claims from either side."1 The border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is an 
agreed line on the map. The two countries have agreed to accept the boundary which 
was established by their colonial predecessors. The 141 st meridian east longitude was 
defined as the border dividing the Dutch possession in the West, and the German and 
British possession in the East in the Agreement of 1885."2
Further, the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problems do not fall under 
‘functional’, ‘resources’, and ‘positional’ boundary disputes, because there is the Basic 
Agreement on Border Administration on 13 November 1973 that reduces and avoids 
these disputes, especially relevant is Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 (see Appendix II). This 
Agreement was negotiated in 1979 and concluded in 1984 with minor but significant 
amendments (see Appendices EH and IV).
These agreements have overcome the problem regarding Prescott’s four different kinds 
of boundary dispute. For example, in the case of functional boundary disputes, the 
problem of traditional border crossers which is caused by the demarcation of the 
boundary between the two countries is covered by Article 3 of the Agreement 1973. 
The boundary has cut communities that have land rights and trade and marriage 
connections. For example, the people of Walomo Village on the north coast 50 
kilometres east of the border in Papua New Guinea remember trading expeditions to 
Jayapura Bay and beyond to Cape Tanah Merah where they exchanged pots, sago and
p-3
^ a u l W. Van der Veur, "New Guinea Annexations and the Origin of the Irian Boundary", AumÜ&I 
Outlook. Vol.18 (1964): p.325.
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tapa cloth for the beads and rings of their currency.1
It is obvious the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problem is not a boundary 
dispute between the two countries. The border problem commenced in the period of 
colonialism in West New Guinea. It arose from policies that the Dutch and the 
Australians pursued in their respective halves of the islands of New Guinea both 
together and separately.
1.2 INDONESIA/PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER PROBLEMS
In the mid 1950’s Australia proposed the formulation of cooperation with the Dutch in 
New Guinea. It seemed that this idea was motivated by pressure from agriculture and 
defence interests in Canberra for the extension of administrative co-operation. The 
Australians believed that New Guinea was important for their agricultural industries 
which required the quantitative guarantees for co-operation between Australia and Papua 
New Guinea. In addition, ‘defence’ is an important consideration as Australia preferred 
the Dutch to be in West New Guinea as they considered that the Dutch were a more 
stable influence than the Indonesians.2 3 Although this idea did not evolve it gave a 
feeling of a united New Guinea. As Verrier concluded "... that the nature o f both Dutch 
and Australian policies had the effect, if not always the intention o f creating both a 
nationalist identity in West New Guinea and a feeling for a united New Guinea"* 
Similarly Yusuf Wanandi argued that "this idea has given rise among other things to an 
obsession among some Papua New Guinea leaders and Australian that the Melanesian
*Hank Nelson, "New Guinea Divided: The Papua New Guinea - Indonesia Border", Kabar Seberang. 
No.5/6 (February, 1979): p.236.
2June Verrier, "The Origin of the Border Problem and the Border Story to 1964", in Between Two 
Nations, ed. RJ. May, p.25.
3ibid„
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culture throughout the whole o f the island of Irian should be united."1
Moreover the origin of the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problems was 
inherited from the policy the Dutch adopted when preparing to give independence to 
West New Guinea by forming the New Guinea Councils in 1961. This idea led to the 
emergence of the OPM which became a major cause of the border problems between 
the two countries. The hope for a united New Guinea and the rise of the OPM are at 
the base of the border problems which developed with the Indonesian policy in Irian 
Jaya from 1962 and continues to this day.
Nyamekye and Premdas rightly said that the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border 
problems are not so much due to the nature of the border, but rather to a determined 
group which refuses to recognise Indonesia’s sovereignty over Irian Jaya. Without the 
OPM activities, the geographic features and ethnic complications of the border would 
not cause so many difficulties for the two countries.2
Further Nelson observed that although there is agreement, border problems will arise: "if 
problems o f quarantine or migration occur, if valuable mineral resources are found, or 
the straits again acquires strategic importance, then that tangle o f lines will result in 
confusion and resentment."3 However the border problems between Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea do not come under this category. Most of these problems have been 
covered by the Basic Agreement on Border Administration. It is a fact that the 
activities of the OPM at the border have contributed to the border tensions.
1 Yusuf Wanandi, "Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Relations: Past, Present and Future: Indonesian views'*, 
in Bevond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers (Waigani & Suva: The University of Papua New Guinea Press 
and The Institute of Pacific Studies, University of South Pacific, 1988): p.86.
2Nyamekye and Premdas, "Papua New Guinea-Indonesia Relations", p.42
k e lso n , "Divided", p.233.
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Different from other movements that have caused problems for Indonesia in the past, the 
OPM has an ethnic relationship with a neighbouring country. Therefore it was no 
surprise when the Indonesia Government decided to use a "military solution" to suppress 
the OPM. This policy encouraged other problems, such as refugees and border 
incursions by the Indonesian military. The clash between Indonesian troops and the 
OPM has increased the number of refugees moving into Papua New Guinea territory 
trying to seek political asylum. The OPM has also put pressure on the local people to 
cross the border into Papua New Guinea. Besides this, Indonesian military operations 
have violated the border in the course of their chasing the OPM.
The movement of refugees and the number of border incursions sharply intensified when 
the "Act of Free Choice" took place. By the end of 1968 about 1200 refugees crossed 
the border.1 Since the establishment of Indonesian rule in West Irian in 1963, there had 
been waves of refugees, but never before on such a scale. During 1964-1965, there 
were been 128 refugees who crossed the border and considerably fewer since then tintil 
1984.2 Further, border incursions also increased. On one occasion in 1969 the 
Indonesian troops crossed the border to search for Irianese and fired on an Australian 
patrol officer and Papua New Guinea police at Wutung. In the south, at Kwari, 
Indonesians shot and killed two Irianese.3 It seems that the growing resistance to 
Indonesia rule and the Indonesia patrols incites refugees and border violations.
Since 1965, the border problem became more ’political’ due to the rise of the 
indigenous resistance to Indonesian Authority. More people crossed the border due to 
political reasons than for traditional or economical reasons. Before 1965 the numbers of
May, "East of the Border Irian Jaya and the Border in Papua New Guinea’s Domestic and Foreign 
Politics", in Between Two Nations, p.89.
Verrier, 'The Origin", in idem., p.41-42.
3Nelson, "Divided", p.237.
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border crossers was still small and most of them were traditional border crossers. They 
crossed the border from time to time in making sago, hunting, or visiting kin. At this 
time the border crossers were not really a problem because they did not threaten the 
security or stability for both sides.
After 1965 however, the border crossers were rebels or refugees who did not want to 
accept Indonesia’s rule in West Irian. There have been some camps along the Papua 
New Guinea side of border at places, such as Wutung, Wans, Skotiau, and Korfor.1
For Indonesia, the existence of refugee camps which become bases for the OPM 
activities on the Papua New Guinea side of the border are a threat to West Irian 
security. Therefore Indonesia has carried out a "military solution" to suppress the OPM 
movement which had sharply increased since 1965. This situation led to an increase in 
border incursions by Indonesia in an effort to pursue rebel refugees. Since 1962 border 
incidents have occurred in the Sepik District and elsewhere in the Western District.2 For 
example, by December 1963, there were reports of armed Indonesian patrols crossing the 
border and sometimes being found many miles inside Papua New Guinea.3 However 
the incidents were not serious enough to affect the relationship between Indonesia and 
Australia, which at the time controlled Papua New Guinea. The lessening of numbers 
of border crossers and border incursions between 1969 and 1972 encouraged the 
countries to achieve the Border Agreement in 1973.
During the 1970s, the situation along the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border has 
fluctuated. In the early 1970s, the border crossers continued, although on a much
Verrier, 'The Origin", in Between Two Nations, ed. RJ. May, p.40-43.
V or details see idem.. Australia. Papua New Guinea and the West New Guinea Question 1949-1969. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Monash University, as cited by Verrier, ibid., p.35.
3ibid.. p.38.
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reduced scale. It seemed that during this period the Indonesian Government 
concentrated on the development of Irian Jaya. But in 1976-1978 the number of 
refugees increased especially in the period leading up to Indonesia’s national election. 
There was at least one major border incursion when Indonesian troops raided a Papua 
New Guinea village and destroyed their gardens while searching for the OPM. It 
seemed that after Papua New Guinean Independence in 1975, the OPM activities 
increased which accelerated Indonesia’s military operations. This was followed by the 
influx of refugees across the border into Papua New Guinea which was reduced in 1979 
after the achievement of the Agreement of 1979.1
In the early 1980s the border situation intensified. There were some border incidents 
instigated by Indonesia . In mid 1982, Indonesia military patrols on several occasions 
crossed the border into Papua New Guinea and a helicopter flying the regional military 
commander to Wamena, 240 kilometres southwest of Jayapura, landed at a mission 
station 10 kilometres southeast inside Papua New Guinea.2 In April 1983, Indonesia 
built a highway called the "Trans Irian Jaya Highway" along the length of the border 
to facilitate effective penetration of the province as well as to seal off the border from 
Papua New Guinea. This highway is 850 kilometres of road designed to link the 
southern part of Merauke with the northern part of Jayapura, but it crosses into Papua 
New Guinea at two points near the head waters of the Bensbach River in Western 
Province. Papua New Guinea protested this violation and Indonesia apologized and 
corrected the mistake.3 In March 1984 two foreign military aircraft flew over Green 
River Station, 20 kilometres inside Papua New Guinea from the Irian Jaya border. The
lMay, "East of the Border", in Between Two Nations, p.92-95.
2May, "Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-operation ? The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border and 
Its Effects on Relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia", Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars. 
Vol.19, No.4 (October-December, 1987): p.49.
Vapua New Guinea Foreign Affairs Review (PNGFAR). September, 1983, p.12.
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Papua New Guinea Government believed the two military aircraft to be Indonesian.1
The influx of 12.000 refugees in 1984 has become the "most dramatic" point in the 
history of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea border problems which attracted 
international attention. By late 1984, 4000 refugees, including educated Melanesians 
(teacher, academics, clerics, policemen, soldiers), were camped inside Papua New Guinea 
in the northern area, while 6000 refugees were camped inside of Papua New Guinea in 
the southern area (see Map I)- The military operation which crushed the uprising of the 
OPM in Jayapura stimulated the refugees.
In the period since 1984 the border problem still exists, but it has not escalated as it did 
in 1984. Border crossers still exist, but in small numbers. In September, 1986, a group 
of 747 people crossed the border and arrived in the West Sepik border station of 
Yapsiei.2 The OPM are still active and border incursions still occur. In April, 1988, 
the OPM raided a transmigration settlement, Arso, near Jayapura which was followed by 
some border incursions by Indonesian troops in pursuit of the OPM.3
13  THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INDONESIA/PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER 
PROBLEM
The border problem is very important to the Indonesian - Papua New Guinean 
relationship because it not only generates considerable tension between the two countries, 
but also it could invite Australian involvement if a conflict were to escalate.
1Ü2iä., March, 1984, p . l l .
'‘'Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People. 3rd ed. (Thornton 
Heath, Surrey: Tapol, 1988), p.100.
^Post Courier. May 2 and October 27, 1988.
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It seems that Indonesia and Papua New Guinea see the main cause of the border tension 
from different points of view. Indonesia sees the elimination of the OPM movement as 
a very important factor in overcoming the border problem. She considers that there 
would be no refugees and border incursions if the OPM were destroyed. In Indonesia’s 
view, Papua New Guinea Government’s policy towards the OPM is not tough enough to 
destroy this movement. For these reasons Indonesia is trying to suppress the OPM, and 
border incursions still occur in pursuit of this objective. On the other hand, Papua New 
Guinea sees border incursions by the Indonesian military as a threat to its security.
In these circumstances the ’misperception o f the two states"l could cause conflict 
between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The border incursions by Indonesian troops 
on a large scale to eliminate rebel sanctuaries in Papua New Guinea territory may not 
be accepted by the Papua New Guinea Government. Papua New Guinea sees these 
incursions as a violation of their territorial integrity and a threat to her security and 
stability. Thus there could be clash between the two countries and border tensions 
would mount. On the other hand, Indonesia’s perception that Papua New Guinea 
supports the OPM activities or lets external supporters use her territory to help the 
OPM, may stimulate Indonesia to interfere with military action, although on a small 
scale.
In this respect, how far the increase of border tensions can be managed by the two 
countries will depend on their relationship. The desire to maintain a good relationship 
will prevent the increase of border tensions. Thus, the attitude or policies of the two 
Governments will determine the situation at the border, as long as it can be tolerated. 
When the border problem cannot be tolerated by one of the two countries it will affect 
their relationship.
*David Hegarty, South Pacific Security Issues An Australian Perspective. Working Paper No. 147 
(Canberra; The Research School of Pacific Studies, A.N.U., 1987): p.18.
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A change of Government (which may employ a hostile policy) could make the border 
problems break into conflict The rise of a possibly aggressive policy on the part of 
Indonesia towards Papua New Guinea and the emergence of a Papua New Guinean 
policy hostile towards Indonesia could incite the parties into conflict Indonesia may at 
times cross the border to destroy the OPM bases without respect to Papua New Guinea 
authorities. On the other hand Papua New Guinea could let her territory be used by the 
OPM against Indonesia. If either country cannot tolerate this policy, the border tensions 
would intensify and conflict between the two countries could break out
In all of these situations, in view of their relationship, Papua New Guinea is likely to 
seek Australian support In December, 1987 Papua New Guinea and Australia signed 
the ‘Joint Declaration of Principles’ which strengthened the Papua New 
Guinean-Australian relationship.1 2 For this reason, Australia would possibly give support
to Papua New Guinea if there was possible conflict between Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea. It seems that Australia sees that a possible Indonesian attack on Papua New 
Guinea would threaten Papua New Guinean sovereignty and Australia needs to defend it 
in view of their relationship. According to Hegarty "... in certain circumstances, all the 
members o f the ’triangle’ could be drawn into conflict."1 Furthermore the Parliament of 
the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence noted:
"the implications o f the continuing unsettled security and political situation in West Irian 
cannot be ignored within the context o f examining potential sources o f conflict in which 
Australia might become involved..."3
Australia would probably become involved in a possible conflict between Indonesia and
^bid.
2Ibid.
^ e  Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
Threats to Anstmlia’s Security Their Nature and Probability (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Services, 1981), p.37.
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Papua New Guinea. However, how far would the Australian Government be involved in 
this conflict? In such a conflict Australia could be involved in discussions about the 
defence contingencies of Papua New Guinea against Indonesia.1 Further, the Australian 
Government could provide strong diplomatic non combat support elements, logistic and 
financial support, and increase its training efforts for the Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force (PNGDF).2 It is unlikely the Australian Government would commit ground force 
elements to the defence of Papua New Guinea. According to estimates by Langtry and 
Ball, Australia would need to have six to nine deployable battalions "in order to give 
effective assistance to Papua New Guinea in a contingency o f low-level border incursions 
by Indonesia."3 *
Similarly, Ross Babbage estimated that the current Australian capability of two to three 
battalions plus support elements (about 2000-4000 personnel) to commit to the defence 
of Papua New Guinea "could easily be swallowed up in the Papua New Guinea 
environment for little real return."*
In these circumstances, the commitment of Australia could cause protracted conflict 
Besides, the participation of other countries in these circumstances could threaten the 
stability of the Southwest Pacific region. As Babbage observed: "at least some 
American assistance would probably be forthcoming" due to the ANZUS alliance, 
although Papua New Guinea is not a member of this alliance.5 In addition, the South
^egarty, South Pacific. p.20 and 27.
^Ross Babbage, The Dilemmas of Papua New Guinea (PNG) Contingencies in Australia Defence 
Planning. Working Paper No.128 (Canberra: The Research School of Pacific Studies, A N .U . 1987), p.14.
3JL. Langtry and Desmond J. Ball, Controlling Australia’s Threat Environment (Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, RsPac, A.N.U., 1979): p.32, as quoted in Hegarty, South Pacific, p.27.
^Babbage, The Dilemmas, p.15.
SIbid.. p.5.
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Pacific Forum members could provide diplomatic support to oppose Indonesia’s attitude.
In conclusion, it is obvious that the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problem 
is not a boundary dispute as happens in international relations. The OPM activities, 
refugees, and border incursions have constituted border problems for Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea since 1965. The border problems still continue and fluctuate. The 
inflow of 12.000 refugees in 1984 was the ‘most dramatic one’ in the history of the 
Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problems.
However, it does not mean there is no room for the possibility of conflict 
Misperception between the two countries and the change of government into one who 
employs a hostile policy could make the border problems burst into conflict In these 
circumstances the ‘special’ relationship between Papua New Guinea and Australia could 
invite the latter to commit some non-combat and diplomatic supports, but not ground 
force support.
Accordingly, the border problems are very important in the Indonesian and Papua New 
Guinean relationship, not only for two countries, but also for the Southwest Pacific 
region.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM ON THE INDONESIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER
To understand the underlying causes of the border tensions, we first need to examine the 
contributing factors from the Indonesian side which mainly focus on three factors: the 
Independence Movement (the OPM) in Irian Jaya; and the Indonesian Government’s 
policies concerning Transmigration and Development in Irian Jaya. These should not be 
seen as separate factors. Rather, it will be shown that it is their interaction which 
produces their significant contribution to the border tensions.
2.1 THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
The OPM has become a problem for Indonesia due to its activities in Irian Jaya. The 
OPM is a Movement which does not want to accept Indonesia’s rule over Irian Jaya but 
wants to claim independence for the West Papuan people1. To maintain its sovereignty 
over Irian Jaya, Indonesia has tried to suppress this movement by military force since its 
emergence in 1963. Although the Indonesian Government has managed to overcome 
some separatist movements in the 1950’s, for instance, PRRI (Revolutionary Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia) by military force2 it has not succeeded in suppressing the 
OPM.
Actually, Indonesia should not find it difficult to crush this movement in view of the
R em das and Nyamekye, "Papua New Guinea 1978: Year of the OPM", Asian Survey. VoL19, N o.l 
(January 1979): p.67.
^de Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy. 1945-1965 (The Hague: Morton, 
1973), p.299.
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small number of OPM hard core members; the lack of military capability, and of 
external support; as well as the weakness of the OPM’s leadership1. But the natural 
terrain, and the existence of a direct border with a neighbouring state which has ethnic 
relationships with this movement make Indonesia’s efforts to eliminate the OPM more 
difficult. The OPM can cross the border to avoid the Indonesian Military Operation. 
This, in turn, leads to border tensions with Papua New Guinea.
The OPM, has so far not threatened Indonesian territorial integrity, but their activities, to 
some extent, have endangered Indonesian domestic security in Irian Jaya by attacking 
isolated patrol posts, mine sites, transmigration settlements, and air strips. For example 
the OPM guerrillas have sabotaged the pipeline of the Freeport Copper and Gold Mine 
at Timikia in 19772 3*. For this reason, some people in Indonesia consider the OPM a 
"disturbing security movement"*.
However, other people believe the OPM has the potential of bearing political influence 
on the local people in Iran Jaya. One can argue that the rise of the outflow of refugees 
from Irian Jaya to Papua New Guinea in 1984, was not only because of "Indonesian 
reprisals", but also "the influence and organisation o f the OPM leadership was a prime 
factor"*. This seems to be one of the reasons why some of the refugees cross the 
border. The OPM may have influenced villagers to flee across the border with false 
promises.5
R em das, "The Organisasi Papua Merdeka in Irian Jaya; Continuing and Change in PNG’s Relations 
with Indonesia", Asian Survey. VoL25, No.10 (October 1985):p.l06.
^egarty, South Pacific, p.20.
3The Australian. April 21, 1989.
^egarty, South Pacific, p.20.
5Alan Oaisa, "Indonesia - PNG Relations: Past, Present and Future: PNG Views" in Beyond the Border. 
ed. Edward P. Wolfers, p.103
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So, it can be seen in the case of the uprising that the OPM is not just a "disturbing 
security movement' as some people in Indonesia think. The raising of the West Papuan 
Rag has represented a claim for West Papuan Independence. West Papuan Nationalism 
arose in the late 1950’s, especially in the last five years before 1962 when the Dutch 
actively made preparations to grant independence to West New Guinea and mobilised 
local opinion against Indonesia1. The OPM has held some "disturbing security 
movement" to attract Indonesian attention to their objective, independence for West 
Papua.
In order to understand the OPM’s objective, it is important to look at the origin of the 
OPM in this territory. Furthermore, by examining its origin and its development it can 
been seen how far the OPM is prepared to go to achieve its objective.
The history of the West Papuan independence struggle goes back to the 19th Century 
when West New Guinea was occupied by the Dutch2. But the origin of the OPM can 
be traced from the history of the struggle for West Papuan independence in the 20th 
Century when the Dutch colonialists came back to control West New Guinea in 1946 
which was followed by the Indonesian’s claim over this territory in the 1950s.
Motivated by their interest, the Dutch were prepared to give West New Guinea 
independence. The Dutch launched "a crash programme" (1952-1961), and established 
The New Guinea Council (1961) which introduced the West Papuan National flag and 
anthem. By doing this the Dutch attempted to "discourage pro Indonesian sentiments
'‘Ian Bell, Herb Frith and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge to Indonesian Authority in Irian 
Jaya; Old Problems, New Possibilities", Asian Survey. Vol.26, No.25, (May, 1986): p.544.
^ o n ie  Sharp, The Rule of the Sword, the Story of West Irian (Victoria: Kibble Books, 1977), p .l l .
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among the educated, chain',l and "to guide the Papuan people toward seif-government and 
the exercise o f the right of self-determinations..."* 2. However, the expectation of the 
educated elite to bring about independence did not eventuate, because on May 1, 1963, 
Indonesia commenced administering this territory subject to the New York Agreement, 
1962.
When the Dutch left in 1962 there was some resistance against Indonesia which was 
suppressed by Indonesian military force. In April, 1963 the Front National Papua (FNP) 
was established in the Netherlands which largely consisted of former members of the 
New Guinea Council. The Chairman of the FNP was Marcus F. Kasiepo a former 
member of the New Guinea Council for the Biak-Numfort district3. The OPM which 
was established in West Irian in 1963 derived from the FNP. Savage (1978) observed 
that in trying to achieve the West Papuan independence in this period, the OPM 
attempted to link with "the Dutch colonialists, the Indonesian’s ‘middle strata’ 
colonialisers and political exiles in Dutch New Guinea, the UNTEA”4.
But the West Papuan elite was disappointed when Indonesian sovereignty over West 
New Guinea was confirmed by the people through the ‘Act of Free Choice’ in 1969. 
The Papuan elite, as Savage discovered, realised that they "... have sought to make 
linkages with the peasant and proto peasant masses and have chosen the road of
^obin  Osborne, "OPM and the Quest for West Paouan Unity” in Between Two Nations, ed. RJ. May:
p.52.
2Gde Agung, Twenty, p.300.
3Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Indonesia and West New Guinea: the New Dimension of Conflict", Orbis. 
VoL14, No.2 (Summer, 1970): p.390.
4
Savage, "The National Struggle in West Irian: The Division within the Liberation Movement, Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Sociology. Vol.14, No.2, (1978)^.142-148, quoted in Osborne, "OPM and the 
Quest" in Between Two Nations, ed. R J. May, p.53.
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organised armed struggle."l. This was followed by the establishment of a Provisional 
Revolutionary Government led by Seth Rumkorem, as both the Head of Government and 
the Chairman of the OPM in July, 1971. After this the OPM started to attract 
sympathetic contact with the local villagers which instigated Indonesian military 
reprisals. These reprisals in turn encouraged villagers to support the OPM movement, 
especially in rural areas.
Premdas observed that there was some basis for the OPM, such as ‘forced territorial 
incorporation into Indonesia’, ‘cultural imperialism’, ‘political repression’, ‘loss of 
identity ’, and ‘alienation of land'1. It seems that the first two bases related to
Indonesia’s strategy which succeeded in the United States forcing the Dutch to abandon 
West New Guinea to Indonesia through the United Nations by the ‘Act of Free Choice’.
Further, the base of ‘political repression’ seemed to relate to Indonesian political 
policies in Irian Jaya. In 1963, the New Guinea Council was disbanded and replaced by 
Regional Assembly whose members were appointed by the Indonesian Government. 
None of the former Council members were included in this Assembly. In this period, 
for example, new political parties were prohibited as Indonesia needed to carry out 
tough political measures to maintain order during this period3.
So, it might be true that the first three bases are some of the reasons why the OPM to 
rejects Indonesia. However, the latter two bases, such as "loss of identity" and 
"alienation of land" brought about by the Indonesian ‘Transmigrasi’ Programme probably 
happened in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is unlikely that the "loss of identity" and
W
R e m d a s , "Continuing and Change", p.1062. 
3Budiardjo and Liem, W est Papua. 3rd ed., p.15-16.
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"alienation of land" occurred in the 1960s and the early 1970s as in this period only 
267 families (1060 transmigrants) were moved to a few tiny settlements such as 
Merauke (Kumbe, Kurik & Kuprik) near Jayapura, Nabire and Manokwari on the north 
coast. Thus it was doubtful, that such a small number of transmigrants had stimulated a 
concern about the "loss identity" and the "alienation of land" that was one of the basis 
of the OPM in this period.
It could, however, be true that concern was shown when the Indonesian ‘Transmigrasi’ 
Programme in the period of the fourth Five Year Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima 
Tahun ke IV/Repelita IV) 1984-1989 planned to move large numbers of people to Irian 
Jay a.
In addition, as stated earlier, it should be taken into account that the Indonesian military 
policies may be one of the reasons the OPM used to gain support. There are several 
writings on the Indonesian military action to suppress the OPM activities. For example, 
in the years 1979-1982 there have been som6 operations called Operasi Sapu Bersih 
(Gean-Sweep Operation), Operasi Galang I and n  (Reinforce Operation I and II)1, which 
instead of destroying the OPM encouraged village sympathisers to the OPM Movement
Up to now, the OPM has been trying to oppose the Indonesian Government by 
mobilising villager supporters. The OPM hard core members are small in numbers but 
their sympathisers can be underestimated. Indonesia estimates that there are only a few 
hundred which comprise the hard core of the OPM2. Reliable observers put figures at 
400-600 guerillas but with "an extensive network o f floating recruits available for quick 
mobilisation and potentially summing into several thousands',3. Thus, the potential of the
^bid., p.74-75.
^eter Hastings, "Prospects: ‘A State of Mind", in Between Two Nations, ed. RJ. May: p.221. 
R em das "Continuing and Challenge", p.1061.
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political influence of the OPM should be taken into account, because they have the 
capability to stimulate the revival of the West Papuan nationalism to claim the West 
Papuan independence due to the Indonesian policies concerning the Transmigrasi 
Programme and development in Irian Jaya.
22  TRANSMIGRASI
Transmigration in Irian Jaya has become a contentious aspect of the Irian Jaya 
development. It has given rise to concerns about the ‘loss o f identity\  and the 
‘alienation o f land’ of the Melanesia people in Irian Jaya which resulted in the 
dissatisfaction of the local people. It arose, especially in the period of Repelita IV 
(1983/84 - 1988/89) when Irian Jaya was seriously considered as the transmigration 
target of 137,000 families (600,000 transmigrants) over the five years. The shortage of 
suitable areas in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan encouraged this plan. Another view 
was that because "Sumatra and Kalimantan are fu ll' in the latter years of Repelita HI1. 
Consequently, Irian Jaya was considered for this programme.
Compared with the estimated current population of 1.3 million people in Irian Jaya, of 
which one million are Melanesian, it can be understood that the target of 600,000 
transmigrants has stimulated the concern of ‘ loss o f identity ’. Further, by the end of 
1984, 24 major transmigration sites had been built alienating a total of 700,000 hectares 
of land from the traditional owners. Therefore, the transmigration settlements also 
incited concern about ‘alienation of land’2.
In the 1960s - 1970s, Irian Jaya did not become a priority area for the Indonesian
1H. Arndt, "The Transmigration in Irian Jaya", in Between Two Nations, ed. RJ. May: p.166-168.
^udiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.51-52.
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Transmigrasi Programme. As mentioned earlier in the 1960s there were only 267 
families who moved to a few small settlements in Irian Jaya. In 1971-1973 another 260 
families were brought to six villages. In 1975, 200 families also moved to Nabire. 
Clearly, Irian Jaya did not have a significant area of land taken over for the transmigrasi 
programme during 1969-1979. This was due to the geographical condition of the 
territory and its distance from Java. In addition, the political situation of Irian Jaya in 
the 1960s made the implementation of the transmigrasi programme in this territory 
impossible1.
Nevertheless, in the 1980s Irian Jaya was once again considered as a priority area for 
the transmigrasi programme due to the growth of population in Java. Therefore in the 
period Repelita III (1979/80 - 1983/84), the significant number of 13,650 families were 
moved to this territory.
It is clear, that the Transmigrasi Programme in Irian Jaya is part of the National 
Transmigrasi Programme which is very important for Indonesian development This 
programme was started during the Dutch colonial period in 1905, and Sumatra, 
Kalimantan, together with Sulawesi were areas for the Dutch Transmigrasi Programme at 
that time. The Indonesian Government continued the Transmigrasi Programme although 
in a broader sense than existed in the Dutch period.
The Indonesian Government promulgated Law No.3 of 1972, wherein seven goals of 
transmigration are set out as: improving living standards; regional development; more 
balanced population distribution; equal distribution of development across the country; 
utilisation of natural and human resources; national unity; and national defence and
bean M. Hardjono. Transmigration in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 1977), p . l l .
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security1. To achieve the transmigration goals, the Transmigration Department gives an 
opportunity for 10 per cent of local residents to become local transmigrants. In Irian 
Jay a, the percentage of local residents for participation in the APPDT (Alokasi 
Pemukiman Penduduk Transmigrasi /The Allocation of Transmigrant Settlement) 
Programme is now 25 per cent. Loekman Soetrisno when he visited the Jayapura 
District sites (Arso, Koya Timur, Koya Barat, Nimborang I and II) discovered problems 
that the APPDT faced in regard to the local people in the transmigration settlements 
which are discussed below2.
Generally, in achieving the transmigration goals the Indonesian Government faced 
problems such as land, fanning systems, ethnic relations, migration selection and welfare 
services, administration and costs3. In the case of the Irian Jaya Transmigrasi 
Programme, the first three problems seemed to be the main problems for the local 
people in transmigration sites.
Firstly, the land problems have arisen not only because of the geographical condition, 
but is also associated with the local people. In context of the geographical conditions, 
unfamiliar soils, terrain, and climate were some of the reasons that a few of the 
settlements failed. For example, transmigration settlements in Merauke, Jayapura and 
Manokwari failed in 19714. Further, the land problems stimulated hostility from the 
local people towards the transmigrasi programme. This was because the ‘local land
1 Colin Mac Andrews, "Central Government and Local Development In Indonesia: An Overview", in 
Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia. Idem. (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986): 
p.158-160.
2Soetrisno, "The Problematic": p.5.
3See further detail discussed in Arndt, ‘Transmigration: Achievements, Problems and Prospects", Bulletin 
of Indonesia Economic Studies. Vol.19, No.3 (December, 1983): p.59-65.
4Gamaut and Manning, Melanesian Economy, p.38-39; see also the explanation about the geographical 
condition of Irian Jaya in Hardjono, In Indonesia, p.90.
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claims' were not settled and this should have been dealt with before the arrival of 
transmigration1. In this respect, the local government and the local transmigration 
department seemed to see the land problem as "an issue of local customary law". They 
did not consider the land as an important issue for the local people who were concerned 
that their hunting areas would be reduced2.
Hunting is one of the main sources of food for the local people and the transmigration 
settlements have made their hunting areas disappear. Therefore, the local people demand 
high compensation for their land, but the officials refused to offer compensation for 
‘uncleared land". Furthermore, the local people who are Melanesian, believe that the 
land rights are "an absolute command of mankind and o f the God that the land of the 
aboriginal Melanesian must be p r o t e c t e d But the officials strongly deny this 
Melanesian belief in the land being inalienable3 *5.
But one may argue that the transmigrasi programme does not want to take the land of 
the local people, rather for the "utilisation o f unoccupied land for sedentary agriculture"6. 
Certainly, the local people, who are very simple in their way of thinking, may not 
understand this term. They just feel that transmigration has taken their rights to the 
land 7. The land problem has stimulated the hostility of the local people.
^ardjono, "Transmigration: A New Concept?", Bulletin of Indonesian of Economic Studies. Vol.14, No.l 
(March, 1978): p.110.
2Soetrisno, "The Problematic", p.4.
3Osbome, Indonesia's Secret W ar The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Java (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985),
p.130.
Bernard Narokobi, "A View from PNG", Arena No.65 (1983): p.105.
5Osbome, Secret War, p.130.
^Hardjono, "Transmigration: Looking to the Future", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. VoL22, 
No.2, (August, 1986): p.46.
7Soetrisno, "The Problematic", p.5.
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Secondly, the fanning system has become another problem for the transmigrasi 
programme in Irian Jaya. The Javanese transmigrants and the local people have 
different fanning systems. Javanese transmigrants are accustomed to sedentary 
agriculture. This is very different from the agriculture of the indigenous people, except 
possibly the Mandrobe at the foot of Jayawijaya Mountain Range. Their farming system 
is a cross between shifting cultivation and hunting1. Accordingly, it is difficult to 
synchronise these farming methods. Besides, the local people have found difficulty in 
absorbing the new technology from transmigrants, since they do not have as quite highly 
developed gardening cultures, except for the Muyu and the Mandrobe2. The problem of 
different farming systems has contributed to the local people’s opposition to this 
programme.
Thirdly, the ethnic relation problems have arisen due to the different ethnic relations 
between the Melanesian people in Irian Jaya and the Javanese transmigrants. Generally, 
the indigenous people do not welcome the Javanese transmigrants, especially when the 
transmigrants are a majority. Relations with the indigenous people proved easy if they 
gained benefit from employment or business opportunities which opened up when a 
transmigration settlement was established in a particular area3. In the case of Irian Jaya 
however, the local people do not enjoy the transmigration settlement facilities due to 
different customs and strong ties with their villages. They are not used to staying in the 
type of houses that the transmigrasi programme have planned. They do not feel secure 
in staying with other transmigrants in their settlements. This feeling has encouraged
1 Ibid., see also George J. Aditjondro, "Settler and Tribal Farmer", Unpublished paper (Cornell 
University, 1981), p.12, as cited by Soetrisno,"The Problematic", p.5.
2Ibid.
3 Arndt, 'The Achievement", p.64.
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them to return to their villages1. The potential benefit of the transmigrasi programme 
such as new roads, in particular, has been enjoyed by immigrants who dominate 
economic activities in Irian Jay a2.
The Indonesian Government therefore has faced all of these problems in reaching the 
transmigration goals. This programme, to some extent, has achieved cheaper agricultural 
produce for the towns and the improvement of the infrastructure3. It may help for the 
goal of regional development but for the local people, the living standards have not 
improved. Rather it has caused the rise of hostilities and led to opposition from the 
local people.
As a result, the objective of national unity, national defence and security has not been 
accomplished. This was because to bring about the goals, it requires a new society at 
the border which has economic and political necessity to become a ‘cordon sanitair’ in 
the border region. To create this new society it is important that the transmigrasi 
programme increase the living standards of the local people and above all, they must 
accept this programme4.
Up to now it is still questionable whether the transmigration target of the Repelita IV 
period has been met. Until October, 1986 the Ministry of Transmigration has put a 
figure on the number of transmigrants. It stated that 23,088 families (95,294 
transmigrants) have settled in Irian Jaya and GOI (The Government of Indonesia)
^oetrisno, "The Problematic", p.5-6.
2Manning, "Irian Jaya", in Indonesian Assessment 1988. ed. Hall Hill and Jamie Mackie (Canberra; 
Department Political and Social Change, ANU, 1989): p.74-75.
3Ibid. 74.
4Soetrisno, "The Problematic", p.3-4.
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proposes to adjust the target at the rate of 2,000 families per year1. Thus, it is doubtful 
whether the 98,500 families (490,000 transmigrants) which were due to move to Irian 
Jaya in the years 1986 to 1989 (as a newspaper in Irian Jaya stated) could be met2. In 
1986/87 there was a cut of over 40% in the manpower and the transmigration section 
of the development budget, compared with the previous fiscal year, and this showed that 
the transmigration target would not be achieved3.
It is clear that the transmigration target of the Indonesian Government in Irian Jaya has 
not been met. Meanwhile a land survey for many sites has been prepared. Studies are 
being made for a further 1,977,000 hectares of land to be found as suitable for 
transmigration sites4. Therefore, it is no surprise that the concern for the "loss o f 
identity" and "the alienation of land' has spread in both Irian Jaya and Papua New 
Guinea. This feeling has led to the dissatisfaction of the local people towards the 
Indonesian Government.
23  DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN IRIAN JAYA
Indonesia’s development policy in Irian Jaya also contributes to border tensions. The 
lack of opportunity for the local people in finding jobs in most sectors of the town; the 
feeling that only a small proportion of the wealth from the exploitation of Irian Jaya’s 
mineral resources by foreign investors, and other parts of Indonesia, will flow back to 
Irian Jaya; and the lack of sensitivity in developing highland areas, has arguably led to
Government of Republic of Indonesia and United Nations Development Program. Regional 
Development Planning For Irian Java. (Lavalin International Inc. in association with P.T. Hasfam Dian 
Konsultan, May, 1987), p.77.
^Tifa Irian. 31 May, 1987, as cited by Budiardjo and Liem. West Papua, p.52.
3B. Glass burner, "Survey of Recurrence Development", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol.2, 
N o.l (April, 1986): p.1-23.
Government of Republic of Indonesia and United Nations Development Programme, Regional p.77.
29
dissatisfaction on the part of the local people.
The lack of job opportunities for the local people, which has become an important 
problem in the development of Irian Jay a, is a result of the education policy and the 
influx of immigrants with regard to education, it is necessary to look at the education 
policy of the Dutch period before 1962.
In 1961, under the Dutch, education was only 11 per cent of total expenditure. 
However, education was poorly adjusted to the manpower needs of the economy. Only 
about 1,000 pupils, including 400 Irianese attended advance primary or intermediate 
secondary schools in 1962. And the single secondary school had 157 students, including 
22 Irianese, in the lowest three classes. A number of vocational and technical schools 
had a total of 975 students. There were no tertiary education institutions. In 1961 there 
were 95 Irianese who were studying abroad and only this small number could adjust to 
the manpower needs1. Obviously education was developed under the Dutch which 
caused the lack of skilled personnel.
After Indonesia took over Irian Jaya, the education policy has included a priority aspect 
which was developed by the FUNDWI Programme and the First Five Year Planning 
(Repelita I) in 1969/70 - 1973/74. The FUNDWI Programme in particular, established 
projects aimed at developing human resources, especially vocational and teacher training. 
In addition, other levels of education have also been expanded by the Indonesian 
Government: enrolments at primary schools in 1972 (123,700) were more than double 
the 1961 level; secondary school enrolments also developed faster (from 3,232 in 1963 
to 13,973 in 1970); enrolment in vocational training schools rapidly expanded (from 
1,356 in 1963 to 3,346 in 1970); and for tertiary level, Cendrawasih University was
'Gamaut and Manning, Melanesian Economy, p.17, 21, 49.
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established in 19621.
The number of enrolments was impressive but it should be remembered, however, as 
Lagerberg argued, that the increase of high school and vocational training centre 
enrolments was a result of the influx of immigrants and not because of local people 
coming up from the junior grades. The immigrants, probably, had taken advantage of 
the opportunities open to them2. This is borne out by Gamaut and Manning who 
observed that the unskilled wage and self-employment areas were taken by immigrants 
and most of the local primary school graduates remained in their villages3. In addition, 
the shortage of teaching personnel became a problem in filling the education needs. 
Similarly, vocational training centres with sophisticated equipment established at Jayapura 
in 1971 were not successful due to the lack of expatriate staff*.
In the early 1980s the highest proportion of the development budget in Irian Jaya (one 
third of the total budget) was allocated to the education sector, especially primary 
schooling under the National Inpres Programme, which almost doubled enrolments since 
1970. The enrolment of both secondary and tertiary education have been fivefold 
between the years 1970-1985, but the tertiary graduates still remained small. However, 
again the immigrants seemed to take advantage of this opportunity. The enrolments of 
upper secondary and tertiary levels were filled by children bom to immigrants3.
It is clear, then, that the small amount of attention that the Dutch gave to develop
1ßÜd-. P-26.
"^ Kees Lagerberg, West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1979), p.121. 
Gamaut and Maiming, Melanesian Economy, p.27.
*Ibid.. p.29.
3Manning, "Irian Jaya", in Indonesia Assessment. 1988. ed. Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, p.66-68.
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education in the past was the cause of the lack of skilled personnel Indonesia 
attempted to overcome this problem by expanding education rapidly and gave 
opportunities for immigrants to come to Irian Jaya by lifting the ‘quarantine’ of this area 
in 1969 to encourage development. Manning rightly said that "the initial justification for 
employment o f immigrant civil servants was primarily the shortage of educated and 
experienced Irianese administrators."l
The immigrants themselves became a problem in the development of Irian Jaya, not only 
in education opportunities as stated earlier, but also in job opportunities. There are three 
immigrant groups, the so called BBM (Bugis, Butonese and Makassarese) which gained 
benefits from development in Irian Jaya. In the mid 1980s, the number of immigrants 
increased to 40 per cent of the total urban population of approximately 350,000, and it 
is likely to increase by 1990 to 50 per cent2. Immigrants are generally more successful
I
in many sectors than the local people with regard to the competition for jobs, such as 
urban informal sectors, industry sectors and public service employment.
In the urban informal sectors, the local people find it more difficult to maintain an 
equitable share in an already highly competitive urban job market3. The mining sector, 
did appear to give the local people an opportunity to gain employment. For example, 
in the Freeport Case, they used several hundred local people for the unskilled jobs, but 
this number decreased to 40 by the end of the construction phase4. In fishing activities, 
Butonese and Torajanese were prominent in obtaining productive fishing areas. The
hbid.. p.67.
2Ibid.
^Further details see Government of Republic of Indonesia and United Nations Development Programme,
Regional. October, 1987, Chapter 1, p.l.; see
4Osbom, Secret War, p .l 19.
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local people only received little compensation for the licensing of foreign companies to 
fish their traditional waters. However, in terms of public service employment the 
competition from immigrants, even for lower level jobs, limited the job opportunities for 
the local people. Although opportunities for experienced Irianese to fill senior positions 
in the Government, the key officers in Central Government Departments and important 
lower level officials (‘camat’ or head of sub-district) are still employed from outside the 
province \
Furthermore, Irianese are concerned about the outcome of the exploitation of Irian Jaya’s 
mineral resources. Irianese feel that the wealth that comes from this industry is not 
used for Irian Jaya and for the needs of the local people. Smith argued that "a 
significant proportion of the wealth flows directly to overseas investors and little o f the 
State’s share finds it way back to Irian Jaya'’* 2. This was confirmed by Manning’s 
estimation that copper mining and oil exploitation has dominated the gross regional 
domestic product (GRDP) since the mid 1970s, but these developments have not had 
much impact on the regional economy3. This seemed to be true, because in the case of 
Freeport, this company did not have a specific obligation in the development of the 
areas4.
The next factor, which is very important, in the development of Irian Jaya, is the lack 
of sensitivity in developing the highland areas. Although there was not much 
development of West New Guinea under the Dutch the Indonesian Government has had
banning, "Irian Jaya", in Indonesia Assessment. 1988. ed. Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie: p.68.
^Terence Wesley Smith, "Lost Melanesian Brothers: The Irian Jaya Problem and Its Implication for Papua 
New Guinea", Pacific Studies. Vol.10, No.3 (July, 1987): p.31.
3Gamaut & Manning, "Irian Jaya", in Indonesia Assessment 1988. ed. Hal Hill and Jamie Makcie: p.65.
4Osbome, Secret War, p.119, see also Gamaut and Manning, Melanesian Economy, p.72.
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no difficulty in developing urban areas or towns in Irian Jaya1. Indonesia has made a 
lot of progress in developing towns in Irian Jaya, by improving the roads, sea and air 
transport, agriculture, public health, draining water, drainage, and housing2. According 
to Isaac Hindom when he evaluated the three periods of Repelita, the Irian Jaya 
Economy has shown improvement in becoming integrated into the Indonesian national 
economy system, especially in sectors such as: agricultural; education; transmigration and 
government administration. But there still remains a problem regarding the local 
people’s lack of capabilities to compete with other immigrants and the absence of any 
projects to integrate them into the new environment3.
In addition, the development of rural areas, especially the highland areas has not been 
successful. The effort to develop rural areas has been managed mainly by the Task 
Force, and Operation Koteka. This Operation was initiated on August 17, 1971, but 
from the end of February, 1972 it was placed under the control of the Task Force. The 
Task Force faced problems in developing rural areas, such as the lack of co-ordination 
between departments with a community development role (the education, social and 
health response), and overlapped into the activities of the Special Programmes (the Task 
Force and Operation Koteka) and routine activities of Government Departments4.
It might be true that Indonesia has many problems with regard to the operation of the 
Task Force, but it appears that there is a natural problem which Indonesia did not take
l] M ;  p.18.
^Isaac Hindom, "Pengalaman tiga Pelita bagi Irian Jaya" (Experience of Three of the Five Year Plan for 
Irian Jaya), Paper presented in Seminar Pembangunan Masyaralcat Irian Java (The Development of Irian Java 
Rural Community). Jakarta, April 30 - May 24, 1984, p .ll .
3Ibid.. p.20; see also Manning, "Iran Jaya", in Indonesia Assessment 1988. ed. Hal Hill and Jamie 
Mackie: p.72.
fu rth e r  detailed implementation of the Task Force. Gamaut and Manning, Melanesian Economy, pp.90- 
91.
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into account when developing the highland areas. This is described by some people as 
a "lack of sensitivity" and "lack of knowledge" about indigenous people who live in this 
area. This can be seen from Operation Koteka in 1971.
Operation Koteka aimed at rapidly changing the village pattern of life. This objective 
may be a good idea to achieve acculturation of the indigenous people with other 
Indonesians but the time frame in which they hoped to achieve this object was too 
short. It took two years in each phase and military personnel would be involved in 
carrying out this policy. However, Manuel Kasiepo rightly said that such operations 
must be carried out gradually and could not be forced. Every development concept 
must have a meaning for community itself, so that community would accept it without 
force1. Further, the changing of life patterns should be accompanied by economic 
activities. But the lack of transportation, such as roads, which link the major towns on 
the coast to the highland areas made efforts to develop this area difficult and economic 
activity and welfare has not progressed as much as would be desired2.
Nevertheless, Indonesia realised that the development of the highland areas is very 
important in integrating Irian Jaya with the Indonesian National Development Plan. In 
order to develop this area, with regard to human factors, Indonesia has established a 
body called "Bimbingan Masyarakat Pedalaman" (The Guidance for Highland 
Community).
It would seem that, the immigrant domination of education and job opportunities, 
together with the lack of sensitivity in developing the highland areas has led to the rise
lManuel Kasiepo, "Menghindari Modemisasi yang Keliru" (To Avoid the Wrong Modernisation), in 
Pembangunan Masvarakat Pedalaman Irian Java (The Development of Irian Java Hinterland Community). Idem 
et ai. (Jakarta: Penerbitan Sinar Harapan, 1985): p.92.
^Manning, "Irian Jaya", in Indonesia Assessment 1988. ed. Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie: p.73.
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of dissatisfaction among the local people towards Indonesian policies. This feeling not 
only makes it difficult to invite the local people to integrate with other Indonesians, but 
more importantly, they are reluctant to accept Indonesian rule and are looking for 
another place that would make them feel more secure and ‘at home’, that is the Papua 
New Guinea side of the border, which in turn leads them to cross the border.
2.4 THE CAUSES OF BORDER TENSIONS
The three factors mentioned above have arguably caused the border crossings and border 
incursions which have given rise to the tensions between Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea. For example, the OPM guerillas cross the border to avoid Indonesian military 
operations which occasionally cause border incursions. The dissatisfaction of the local 
people may encourage them to cross the border onto Papua New Guinea soil where they 
can find a place that they feel at ‘at home’, and have a better life. Before 1984 the 
number of border crossings was not a major problem. Between 1962 and 1982’there 
were only 2,000 - 3,000 border crossings into Papuan New Guinea which came about 
for differing reasons, such as: traditional border crossings; a small number of Irianese 
nationalist seeking political asylum; a number of Irianese villagers seeking temporary 
refuge as a result of Indonesian military activities, and the OPM guerillas crossing the 
border to evade Indonesian military operations1.
However, the interaction of such factors have produced a significant contribution to 
border tensions. This seemed to be verified in the case of the influx of 12,000 refugees 
in a few months of 1984 when there were uprisings in Jayapura and Waropko.
In the case of these refugees, one may say that the clash between Indonesia and the
xMay, "Mutual Respect" in Between Two Nations: p.47.
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OPM resulted in waves of border crossings into Papua New Guinea Territory1. Another 
view is that "major Indonesian military operations" and a "major campaign o f fear by 
the OPM rebels" have encouraged these refugees2.
All of these possibilities appear to be the reasons for the waves of refugees crossing the 
border into Papua New Guinean territory (see Map II). First, the clash between the 
OPM and the Indonesian security forces was the cause these refugees, particularly the 
first wave in February, 1984. At the first wave, there were a large number of 
Melanesian soldiers police, civil servants, teachers and students who crossed the border. 
The reports of the existence of the fighting in Jayapura between the OPM and 
Indonesian security forces were all consistent. This seems to be true as city people did 
not usually cross the border. These people fled across the border because they most 
probably feared the fighting, and therefore it was safer for them to cross the border3.
Secondly, major military operations by the Indonesian soldiers and a major campaign of 
fear by the OPM following the above clash most probably incited the second wave of 
refugees in March, 1984. In this respect they have incited the villagers to cross the 
border because they feared the troops who destroyed their huts and gardens while 
searching for the OPM. But it is possible that they fled because of the OPM as well. 
The OPM may have influenced villagers to flee the border by telling them that 
Indonesian troops would shoot and kill them. The OPM may also have encouraged the 
people to leave their homes with false promises. More than 420 people who crossed the 
border came from the north-eastern comer of Irian Jaya, and they camped around the
^egarty, South Pacific, p.20.
2Alan Oaisa, Tndonesia-PNG Relations: Past, Present and Future: PNG views” in Beyond the Border, ed. 
Edward P. Wolfers: p.103.
3Alan Smith and Kevin Hewison, ”1984 - The Year OPM Pulled the Plug on Indonesia-PNG Relations, 
Part 1", Catalyst, VoL15, No.2 (1985): p.96.
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Kamburoto Catholic Mission and at the Green River Government Station, among their 
friends and relatives. They reported a ‘clean up’ operation1. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that these refugees crossed the border because of the OPM as they were village people 
who may be easily intimidated by the OPM.
However, it seemed that the Indonesian threats instigated these refugees. This was 
proven by the incident at Waropko near the town of Mindiptanah on April 10, 1984 
when there was a raising of the West Papuan Flag. This incident led the Indonesian 
soldiers to threaten people that the army would wipe them out if there was a third 
‘incident’. Consequently, an influx of refugees poured into Papua New Guinea territory. 
This was confirmed in a Jakarta press report of a tour by the Irian Jaya Governor 
Hindom, who found that 5,000 out of 8,500 people had gone from the Mindiptanah 
Sub-District while 4,400 out of 6,100 people had gone from Waropko Sub-District 
across the border onto Papua New Guinea soil2.
The next month in May, 1984, there were about 2,500 refugees who came from the 
southern part of the border region which is a long distance from Jayapura to cross the 
border. These people crossed the border to join their relatives to have sago and hunting 
land on the Papuan side of the border. They are recognised as traditional border 
crossers3. In this case, their relatives or people of the same clan may have offered them 
land, which attracted them across the border.
Moreover, one may say that the transmigrasi programme accelerated such refugees to 
cross the border with Papua New Guinea Territory during the 1984 exodus. In the area
W . p.101-103.
2IMd1,p.l01.
hbid.
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between Mindiptanah and Tanah Merah, some villages were completely deserted. 
These refugees reported to a foreign journalist that a land survey was carried out in 
1984 in preparation for transmigration1. However, some people argued that it remained 
unclear whether there was a connection between the intensification of the transmigrasi 
programme and the influx of refugees, as many of these refugees came from areas 
where there was no transmigrants2 3.
This seems to be verified in the case of the first wave of refugees, as they came from 
the city of Jayapura. In the case of the second wave of refugees, some of them came 
from areas where there are transmigration settlements, such as Arso and Waris and when 
they heard reports that there was going to be a ‘clean-up* operation this made them flee 
across the border.
In the case of deserted villages between Mindiptanah and Tanah Merah, it seems highly 
unlikely that any actual transmigration settlement has taken place here. There are some 
settlements in the hinterland of Merauke and there are more transmigration plans for that 
area, but it is questionable whether this caused the exodus of refugees in 1984. Smith 
and Hewison rightly said that "transmigration may represent a threat to these people but 
not an immediate one"*.
In the case of the inflow of 12,000 refugees, then, there were some extenuating 
circumstances which encouraged them to cross the border. This was confirmed by 
stories, such as: clashes; military operation and reprisals; fears and threats and traditional 
motivation. With regard to the people in the camps, the OPM is rarely mentioned. The
^ a m is McDonald, "Still hoping against hope", Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 27 March, 1986,
p.28.
2Ian Bell, Herb Feith, and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge", p.548.
3Smith and Hewison, "The Year OPM, Part I", p.103.
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people are neutral, they are neither for or against i t  But they do talk of their 
independence, and that they will not return until they gain their independence. They 
speak of the transmigrasi programme in the terms of a cultural threat1.
It can be seen here, that the transmigrasi programme, to some extent, was not the main 
cause which encouraged refugees to flee. Rather it was the clashes, Indonesian 
operations and threats, and a fear of the OPM which incited the exodus of refugees.
However, they should not be seen as separate factors. The uprising in Jayapura has 
shown that there was interaction between the three factors which caused the exodus. In 
other words, the OPM took advantage of the dissatisfaction of the local people, both in 
towns and villages.
The increase of the political influence of the OPM in threatening Indonesian security 
seems not to be because of an increase in the hard core numbers of the OPM, but 
because of their capability to mobilise Irianese and to revive their Papuan nationalism 
which is indicated by their association in the uprising at Jayapura. But why does the 
OPM have this capability? This is related to the dissatisfaction of Irianese with 
Indonesian policies, such as military reprisals, the transmigrasi programme and the 
development policy in Irian Jaya. These policies have given rise not only to the 
insecurity of Irianese but also the feeling of being a ‘second class’ in their homeland. 
On the other hand, they realise that the people in Papua New Guinea, who have the 
same ethnicity have a more secure feeling and are ‘hosts’ in their land. This condition 
has revived their dream to have independence the same as their ‘brothers’. Therefore 
they, in turn, show this feeling which was expressed in the uprising in Jayapura when 
the OPM gave them the opportunity. This was followed by the influx of refugees
W
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which expressed their insecurity.
The OPM has benefited from the dissatisfaction of the local people. It seems that the 
OPM realised that the first uprising they initiated would be followed by other uprisings 
in other towns. It was proven by the ‘Second Uprising’ in Waropko. Further, the OPM 
was also aware of the advantage of the existence of the border and the influx of 
refugees. The OPM took advantage of the refugees to gain publicity. The OPM could 
expect that the incident at the Papua New Guinea border would bring the Irian Jaya 
issue to the notice of the United Nations1. Further, it might be true that the OPM 
cannot survive if they do not have support from the indigenous people who are 
disappointed with the Indonesian Government’s policy2. Therefore it might also be true 
that the Indonesian Government has tended to blame the OPM for forcing villagers to 
leave3 for their own benefit.
In other words, if the Indonesian Government succeeds in creating the acculturation of 
the indigenous people with other Indonesian people by making them feel that they are a 
part of Indonesia, it is unlikely that the OPM could survive. The lack of weapons and 
external support, together with the absence of Irianese supporters, would most probably 
bring about the demise of the OPM. More importantly, the question of independence 
would disappear. The traditional border crossings may still occur, but these people 
would not cause border tension as they would not be refugees.
^ aisa , T N G  Views”, in Beyond the Border*, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.103.
2R. Slamet Roosman, "Pembangunan di Irian Jaya’ (The Development in Irian Jaya), Analisa. Vol.8, No.4 
(April, 1979):p.l2.
^ w a r d  P. Wolfers, "Indonesia and PNG, South East Asia and The South Pacific: Mutual Respect and 
Cooperation on and Beyond the Border", Bevond the Borden pJ2 .
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However, the possibilities of the rise of a separatist movement in Irian Jaya due to the 
increase of the dissatisfaction of the local people could not be underestimated. It should 
be remembered that there is ‘Melanesian Solidarity’ with Papua New Guinea and other 
countries. The unwillingness of other Melanesian countries to see the fate of their 
‘brothers’ could give them the moral support in their separatist movement. The possible 
clash between the indigenous people and the immigrants in the towns, together with the 
clash between the local people and the Javanese Transmigrants should be taken into 
account by the Indonesian Government. If a clash occurs and the Indonesian 
Government uses Military force to defuse the situation this could have an unintended 
effect. It could cause the revival of the West Papuan Nationalism against Indonesia and 
could lead to the influx of refugees who cross the border with Papua New Guinea 
territory. This situation, in turn, could stimulate border tensions.
In conclusion, it is obvious that the clashes between the Indonesian soldiers and the 
OPM; the Indonesian Military Operations and a major campaign of fear by the OPM 
and traditional motivation have caused the waves of refugees. The transmigrasi 
programme and development in Irian Jaya were not the main causes which directly 
encouraged a large number of refugees, but the impact of these policies have given rise 
to the disappointment of the local people. This disappointment in turn has been 
exploited by the OPM to gain support. More importantly, although the uprising of 
Jayapura was a failure, this incident has shown the political influence of the OPM to 
mobilise some Irianese against the Indonesian Government Thus, it can be seen that 
the interaction of these factors has caused the exodus of refugees.
The number of refugees has given rise to border tensions and affects the Indonesian and 
Papuan New Guinea relationship. By examining the causes of border tensions it is 
hoped that approaches can be made to reduce tensions at the border. But before this 
happens it is important to look at the causes from the Papuan New Guinea side.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM ON THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA
SIDE OF THE BORDER.
In order to understand the significant causes behind the border tensions on the Papua 
New Guinea side, it is necessary to examine four factors: ethnic relationships; fears of 
an Indonesian ‘invasion’; the existence of the OPM sanctuary on the Papua New Guinea 
side of the border, and the Papua New Guinea Government’s actions.
All of these factors have created a misunderstanding and a mistrust between the two 
countries which contributed significantly to the border tensions. This chapter will 
examine each of these four factors.
3.1 THE ETHNIC RELATIONSHIP
The ethnic relationship between the Melanesian people in Irian Jaya and Papua New 
Guinea which has caused border tensions is a result of the to Papua New Guinean’s 
concern about justice being done to their "brothers" in Irian Jaya in respect to the loss 
of identity and the alienation of land. According to Bernard Narokobi the indigenous 
people in Irian Jaya are Melanesians, because Melanesia includes several South West 
Pacific Islands, such as : East and West Papua New Guinea, Solomon, Fiji, Vanuatu, 
and New Caledonia1. Therefore Papua New Guinea regards the Melanesian people in
Narokobi, "Bernard Narokobi and his Vision of Melanesian", in The Melanesian Wav, ed. Henry Olela 
(Port Moresby: Institute of PNG Studies, 19812): p.12.
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Irian Jaya as their "blood brothers and will always do that until the end of time."1
Motivated by their "Melanesian Brotherhood', some people from Papua New Guinea, 
such as university students, and some Parliament members oppose Indonesia’s 
sovereignty over Irian Jaya. They regard Irian Jaya as a part of Papua New Guinea and 
the people as brothers of Papua New Guinea’s Melanesian group of people should have 
the same rights to obtain independence. As Narokobi pointed out "no race has the right 
to dominate another, through culture, religion, politics or economics."2. Further he 
described "from dawn to dusk, from east to west, the people o f Melanesia are crying for  
freedom and justice."3 *
In addition, they are concerned about the land rights and the culture of Melanesian, 
because Melanesians believe that land rights are "an absolute command, and absolute 
command o f mankind and o f God that the land of the aboriginal Melanesian must be 
protected."*1 Therefore Melanesia must not lose their land due to the Javanese5. This 
view has been supported by Father John Momis, a Papuan New Guinea politician who 
said that "the ordinary man or woman in Papuan New Guinea cannot support the 
destruction of Melanesian culture, on land separated from us only by an artificial 
colonial land border."6
^dem, "A View: p.103.
2Idem. "Vision of Melanesian", p. p.IX.
^dem, "A View", p.105.
ridem, "Vision of Melanesian", p.12.
5Idem, "A View", p.105.
6John Momis, "Prospect for Stability 
/ ,  1986, p.2.
in PNG after Ten Years of Independence", speech to Canberra
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In contrast, the Papua New Guinean Government accepts Indonesia’s sovereignty over 
Irian Jaya. As Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu said in July, 1984 "Papua New 
Guinea recognises that Irian Jaya is an integral part of Indonesia. Thus Papua New 
Guinea Government does not want to interfere in Indonesia’s internal affairs} This does 
not mean, however, that they do not have sympathy with the Melanesian people in Irian 
Jaya. Prime Minister Somare, after condemning the OPM activities in Papuan New 
Guinea admitted '7 have a feeling for Irian Jay ans of Indonesia. We were divided by 
history. We know that we have brothers on the other side, we sympathise with them."'1 2
It can be seen, there is an ambivalence even in Government circles. Some groups, 
mainly some Parliament Members, regard the Melanesian people in Irian Jaya as having 
the same rights to gain their independence as other Melanesians. But the official view 
of the Papua New Guinea Government is more concerned with the ‘fate’ of the 
Melanesian People in Irian Jaya. Thus, there is legitimate concern about what has been 
called "the alienation o f land” and "the disappearance o f Melanesian identity".
It seems the emergence of the unintended effect of Indonesian policies particularly the 
transmigrasi programme, to some extent has created this Papuan New Guinea concern. 
Some people see the transmigrasi programme as "an invasion programme" in order to 
decrease their influence and to kill the Melanesian culture3. Further, one may see that 
this programme will increase the influence of non Melanesian and the Melanesian people 
will eventually be "outnumbered’, their culture and tradition will become assimilated and
‘Rabbie L. Namaliu, "Independent and Constructive Neighbour", in Beyond the Border, ed. Edward P. 
Wolfers: p.47.
2J. Richardson, "Tough Talking on the Border", Island Business. (May, 1984): p.13.
3Victor Kasiepo, "The Free Papuan Movement Fights Back", AMPO Japan - Asia Quarterly Review. 
Vol.19, No.3 (1987): p.48.
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finally their identity will be lost1.
However, one can argue that the Indonesian Transmigrasi Programme needs to be 
understood with regard to the overall concept of the transmigrasi programme generally2. 
This is considered to be the true situation as the transmigrasi programme is part of the 
Indonesian National Development Policy. Indonesia has carried out this programme in 
other islands, such as Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi which has different ethnic 
relations with the transmigrants since the Dutch period. The programme has been 
successful in other areas.
Furthermore, the goals of the transmigrasi programme are clear. Indonesia does not 
want to eliminate any tribal cultures. It should be remembered that Indonesia has 
various ethnic cultures, including Melanesian in the Moluccas, and East Nusa Tenggara, 
and each ethnic culture respects their own cultures and each others. As Indonesians, 
they realise that Indonesia as a nation strives towards "Binheka Tunggal Ika" or "a 
diversity in unity". So, as Yusuf Wanandi said "although Papua New Guinea has a 
Melanesian culture, it does not follow that only Papua New Guinea can understand Irian 
Jaya". For Indonesia, he further argued that "Melanesian culture is not a problem", and 
"it should not be made a political issue" 3
However, it appears that some groups have used ‘Melanesia’ as a political issue by 
talking about the rights of the Melanesian to gain independence. They oppose the 
Papua New Guinea Government’s recognition of Indonesian’s sovereignty over Irian Jaya 
by asserting internal and ethnic links between Melanesian residents on both sides of the
2Ian Beil, Herb Feith, and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge", p.550.
^Wanandi, "Indonesian View", in Bevond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.93.
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border1.
The Papua New Guinea Govemments’s sympathy towards the Melanesians in Irian Jay a 
may cause border tensions and affect the relationship between the two countries. This 
sympathy for various reasons could stimulate them into crossing the border and live on 
the Papua New Guinean side of the border, as they believe that they would be allowed 
to stay in Papua New Guinea due to the ‘permissive residence’ that Papua New Guinea 
gives them. Moreover, the sympathy of some groups, mainly members of opposition 
within the Papua New Guinea Government because of the ethnic relationship have 
encouraged the OPM to establish its sanctuary on the Papua New Guinean side of the 
border which makes it difficult for Indonesia to destroy them.
Obviously, the ethnic relationship between Papua New Guinea and the Melanesian 
people in Irian Jaya has contributed significantly towards the tension between the two 
countries. The awareness by both the refugees and the OPM that they would not be 
treated badly by the Papua New Guinea as they ethnic relations with them is a main 
factor for the border tension. However, there is another factor which caused border 
tensions between the two sides, that is the fears of an Indonesian' ‘invasion’.
32  THE FEARS OF AN INDONESIAN ‘INVASION*.
The fears that Indonesia could have "expansionist designs on Papua New Guinea" seems 
to have derived from the lack of understanding of Indonesian history. There are some 
people who regard Indonesia as having territorial ambitions. Premdas who spoke to 
Papua New Guinea elites, both radicals and pragmatists, has discovered "a strikingly
^yam ekye and Premdas, "Papua New Guinea - Indonesia Relations", p.47.
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widespread underlying fear of Indonesia."1 There is some basis to Papuan New Guinean 
fears of an Indonesian ‘Invasion’, such as: Indonesia’s population and military capability; 
Indonesia’s claim over Irian Jaya (was called West Irian); the confrontation of Malaysia; 
and Indonesia’s acquisition of East Timor2 *4.
In relation to Indonesia’s population, it seems that Papua New Guinea feels vulnerable 
because its neighbours has such a large population. As one Papuan New Guinean said 
"Indonesia is a nation o f 150 million people, and we are only three million people."* 
However, Wanandi argued that "while it is true that Indonesia is a medium or regional 
power, Indonesian need not be regarded as a threat to other countries. On the contrary, 
Indonesia may be a stability factor in the South East Asian region."*
This seems to be verified by the implementation of Indonesian Foreign Policy in the 
South East Asia region under the Soeharto Government Indonesia has brought an 
immediate end to its confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore, and has formed the 
ASEAN Regional Co-operation in 1967 as a vehicle to promote regional stability in 
South East Asia. She also has signed border agreements with her neighbours, such as 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Australia.
In the case of Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia, Indonesia never made claim to 
the northern Borneo States. At that time Sukarno opposed Malaysia because he
LPremdas, Toward a PNG Foreign Policy: Constraint and Choice", Australian Outlook. VoL30, No.2 
(August, 1976): p.273.
2Ibid., see also J.A.C. Mackie, "Does Indonesia Have Expansionist Designs on PNG?", in Between Two 
Nations, ed. RJ. May: p.65.
a
A Papua New Guinean participant in the Indonesian - PNG Seminar in July, 1984 is quoted by Sabam 
Siagian in, "Indonesia-PNG Relations: Past, Present and Future: Indonesian View", in Bevond the Border, ed. 
Edward P. Wolfers: p.98.
4Wanandi, "Indonesian View", in idem, p.91.
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regarded Malaysia as an imperialist scheme of the British who wanted to maintain its 
interest in Singapore, Borneo and Malaysia. Therefore Indonesia opposed Malaysia as 
the natural outcome of the sympathy for the popular uprising of North Borneo against 
British colonial rule. This does not mean, however, that Indonesia wanted North Borneo 
for herself1. Thus Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia should not be regarded as 
demonstrating territorial ambitions on the part of Indonesia.
In connection with Indonesia’s claim to Irian Jaya, the main principle of its claim is that 
Irian Jaya (previously West Irian) was a part of the Netherlands East Indies. However, 
the Dutch always stressed that the right of self detennination must be utilised by the 
population of New Guinea. The Dutch arguments to substantiate this were: the ethnic 
difference between Papuans of West Irian and the rest of the Indonesian people, the 
incapability of the Indonesian Government to rehabilitate West Irian after the war2.
This argument was irrelevant as Indonesia consisted of a number of different ethnic 
groups, including Melanesian, that the Dutch called the Papuans. Indonesia does not 
regard racial affinity as the determining criteria for its nationhood.
Similarly, the arguments of the Indonesian incapability to develop West Irian is not 
valid. It is fact that in the Dutch period West Irian was poorly developed, especially in 
the highland areas and lagged well behind other Indonesian .islands. It should be 
remembered that it was considered that the Dutch kept this territory for their own 
interests and had prepared this territory to obtain independence as discussed in the 
previous chapter.
!Gde Agung, Twenty Years, p.465, Mackie "Over Indonesia", in Between Two Nations, ed. R J. May: 
p.80; see also Bernard Gordon, "The Potential for Indonesian Expansionist", Pacific Affairs. VoL36, No.4 (1963- 
64): p.385.
2
Gde Agung, Twenty Years, p.86.
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Thus, Indonesia’s claim over Irian Jaya derived from "the central principal of 
nationalism and anti colonialism"l to oppose the Dutch who colonised Indonesian 
territories which they called the Netherland East Indies which included West Irian. It 
cannot be accepted that ‘expansionism’ is a factor in the Indonesian campaign for West 
Irian.
In the case of East Timor, there was no claim that this territory had been part of the 
former Netherlands East Indies as there is in Irian Jaya. When the Portuguese left East 
Timor they had not prepared the local people to obtain their independence and Indonesia 
was concerned about their security because of the infighting amongst the three factions 
trying to control power, which resulted in a breakout of fighting between the UDT 
(Uniao Democratica Timoreuse) and the Fretilin in July, 1975. Indonesia tried to co­
ordinate with the Portuguese to facilitate the smooth changeover of power but the 
consultation broke down when the fighting broke out in July, 1975.
Indonesia was concerned that the military victory of the Fretilin would give an 
opportunity for communist regimes to control East Timor and could make this area, at 
least, "a beacon light to flickering sessionist", a launching pad for communist subversion 
against Indonesia2. Thus Indonesia would not have interfered in the national affairs of 
East Timor if the Portuguese Government had conducted a plebiscite properly when it 
was still a Portuguese colony3.
The Papua New Guinea fears of Indonesian expansionism grew due to the lack of 
understanding regarding Indonesian history. It should be remembered that Papua New
J a c k ie , "Does Indonesia" in Between Two Nations, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.91.
^eter Hastings, 'The Papuan New Guinea - Irian Jaya Border Problem", Australian Overlook. VoL31, 
N o.l, (April, 1977): p.58.
^Wanandi, "Indonesia’s View", in Bevond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.91.
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Guinea is very different from other cases in which Indonesia has carried out her
‘tough’ policy. Indonesia does not have a claim over PNG which is different from the
case with Irian Jaya. With Irian Jaya, the Dutch did not want to return this territory to 
Indonesia. It is true that Indonesia does not have a claim over East Timor, but the
decolonisation of the Portuguese Government in East Timor did not proceed smooth
properly, which led to a threat to Indonesian security.
Papua New Guinea is a sovereign state. Indonesia has never made claim to Papua New 
Guinea, Sabah or Sarawak, and has no intention of incorporating them into Indonesia. 
Actually, Papua New Guinea should not consider the possibility of Indonesia invading 
them as Indonesia considers Papua New Guinea as a sovereign state, who is a member 
of the South Pacific Forum, the Commonwealth, and has close relationships with 
Australia. As Hastings rightly said that "..Jakarta has enough problems without adding 
to them...”1. The economic development and maintenance of peace is a priority for 
Indonesia.
Obviously Indonesia does not have territorial ambitions towards Papua New Guinea. In 
the meeting between President Soeharto and Prime Minister Michael Somare in January, 
1977, Soeharto stressed that "Indonesia has never had any territorial ambitions.2 
Nevertheless, the continuing Papua New Guinea fears of an Indonesian ‘invasion’ may 
cause border tensions.
Such fears may stimulate Papua New Guinea’s suspicions towards Indonesia’s policies 
and actions regarding the border. For example, the transmigrasi programme has invited 
Papuan New Guinea suspicions about Indonesia expansion. As Oaisa pointed out in
Hastings, "Irian Jaya Border Problems", p.670.
2See Joint Communiques by President Soeharto and Prime Minister Michael Somare. Johnson, 13th 
January, 1977 as in Bevond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers.
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1984 the transmigrasi programme is "a step towards expansion of present territorial 
boundaries. The placing of non Melanesians among or close to the border would provide 
conditions conducive to such a policy."1
However, Wanandi argued that the transmigrasi programme which is located near the 
border is not based on any military strategy, but because the area is suitable for 
agriculture2. This is the situation in Kurik and Erom which are located close to the 
border of the Merauke Province. The transmigrasi programme is generally successful 
here which is due to the land having a relatively high agricultural potential.3
Furthermore, Mackie discovered that there were general border incidents in 1978 which 
were regarded by many in Papua New Guinea as indications that "Indonesia aspired to 
dominate and perhaps ultimately to annex the eastern half o f the island."* It seems that 
these people did not consider the reasons underlying the border incidents as stated 
earlier. The lack of border markers on the ground has caused Indonesia to violate the 
border in seeking the OPM who fled into Papua New Guinea. It means that over the 
10 years that border incidents have taken place there are still not enough markers to 
define the border properly. This is nothing to do with ‘invasion’ as some people fear.
Therefore, Papua New Guinea’s fear of ‘invasion’ could be an over reaction to 
Indonesia’s action. For example, in relation to the border incidents in 1984 when the 
military aircraft of Indonesia flew over 20 kms. inside Papua New Guinea, the Papuan
^ aisa , "APNG View", in Bevond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.107.
Wanandi, "Indonesian View", in idem: p.91.
3Hilman Najib, "Transmigration Project in Irian Jaya", Indonesian Reports. Culture and Society 
Suppiement (December, 1986), trans. Beverly Blaskett: p.79.
^Mackie, "Does Indonesia", in Between Two Nations, ed. R J. May: p.65.
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New Guinea Government decided to review the continued presence of the Indonesian 
Defence Attache due to the delayed response of the Indonesian Government regarding 
this matter. Moreover, it might be possible that Papua New Guinea would send their 
troops to the border due to the fear that Indonesia would invade their territory if these 
border incidents accelerate. It is unlikely that Indonesian border incursions would occur 
if the OPM did not flee across the border to their sanctuaries in Papua New Guinea.
So, the fear of an Indonesian ‘invasion’ to some groups within Papua New Guinea 
would lead to border tension due to over-reaction to Indonesia’s action. If Papua New 
Guinea does not have such fears, they would not see a ‘threat’ from Indonesia to their 
territory. They would have more understanding of Indonesia’s action which is not a 
‘threat’ to them. Furthermore, they do not need to rely on another country to face 
"such threat'. This, in turn, would decrease tensions between the two countries.
3 J  BASES FOR THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
The existence of OPM sanctuaries in Papua New Guinea territory may cause border 
tensions due to Indonesia suspicions that the OPM could use Papua New Guinea soil as 
a base to fight against Indonesia. Hastings noted in 1985, that there are 14 refugee 
camps which are bases for the OPM on the Papuan side of the border. It means that 
the OPM has become "an increasingly effective political organisation"l which easily 
stimulates Indonesian action.
In this respect, the Indonesian soldiers crossed the border to search for the OPM. 
Further, the Indonesian military may have attacked several of these camps by helicopter
1 Has tings, Indonesian Report. No.29 (1985), as cited by J.W. Smith, "Lost Melanesian Brothers: The Irian 
Jaya Problem and its Implications for Papua New Guinea", Pacific Studies. VoLlO, N oJ  (1987): p J5 .
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transport1, which is likely especially if the OPM increases their attack on Indonesian 
outposts or other targets in Irian Jaya which would threaten the stability and security. 
After attacking the OPM would flee across the border to prevent Indonesian pursuit and 
this, in turn, encourages Indonesia to violate the border which in turn invites Papua New 
Guinea’s protests. It was proved for example, in June, 1978 when six Indonesia patrols 
raided a Papuan New Guinea village and destroyed their gardens in pursuit of the OPM, 
inviting Papua New Guinea’s protestations2. To date, the clash with Papua New Guinea 
forces has been avoided.
Regarding this clash, Smith analysed that a clash with Papua New Guinea’s forces 
seemed inevitable if border incursions continued3. However, it depends on how often 
and how fierce the border incursions occur. As long as border incursions do not 
threaten Papua New Guinea security, or do not stimulate their fears of ‘invasion’, it is 
likely that a clash between Indonesian and Papua New Guinean forces will be avoided. 
It is possible for the two countries to prevent future strains as long as they have a the 
mechanism to communicate, such as the Joint Border Committee. It has been 10 years 
(since the late 1970s) that border incursions have led to a clash between the two 
countries. This situation could change however and a breakdown the relationship could 
occur if the Papua New Guinea Government changes its policy as discussed in Chapter 
1 .
Moreover, Smith stated that other tensions could occur if the Papua New Guinea 
Government allowed the OPM to gain external support while they were camped on 
Papua New Guinea soil. This possibility is based on Osborn’s observation that "the
1Ibid.
2May, "East of the Border", in Between Two Nations, p.97.
3Smith, "Lost Melanesians", p.35.
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linkages between OPM sympathisers in Papua New Guinea and the Soviet Union, Cuba 
and North Korea have been alledged at various times1. In Smith’s view if significant 
external support to the OPM is given it will lead to the potential of an armed conflict 
on Papua New Guinea soil due to Indonesia’s clash with OPM guerillas.
However, this possibility is unlikely as the OPM’s ideologies are not clear. This problem 
has become an obstacle for the OPM in gaining external support either from east or 
west2. In addition, the Papua New Guinea Government will not let those countries use 
Papua New Guinea soil to supply their aids to the OPM. If the Papua New Guinea 
Government allows external support to the OPM it would be within the realms of 
possibility that Indonesia would launch ‘a small lesson attack’ to warn Papua New 
Guinea. But it is highly unlikely that Indonesia would invade Papua New Guinea.
It is true that the OPM operation at the camps in Papua New Guinea have caused 
border tensions and a possible military clash between the two countries, but there are 
other factors that influence the Papua New Guinea Government’s action towards 
Indonesian policies which are discussed below.
3.4 PAPUA NEW GUINEA ACTION
The Papua New Guinea Government’s policy or action with regard to border problems 
may cause tensions, because Indonesia will not tolerate the Papua New Guinea 
Government doing anything which would prevent Indonesia from carrying out its 
policies in the border region.
Osborne, Secret War, p .168-171.
R em das, "Continuity and Change", p.1061.
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To maintain its relationship with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea is attempting to carry 
out a ‘tough line’ policy both to the OPM and the refugees. It seems that the Papua 
New Guinea Government realises that if it is contemplating confrontation with Indonesia 
it must take into account Indonesia’s armed forces which number over 200,000 troops, 
compared with the Papua New Guinea Defence Forces (PNGDF) of 3,500. This 
condition may influence the Papua New Guinea Government not to aid the OPM. As 
Somare said "we have a population of only 2 J  million people. When we see such a big 
population in the country bordering ours we must not create any disputes with 
Indonesia."1
The tough line policy of the Papua New Guinea Government can be seen, especially in 
June/July, 1978 when Papua New Guinea had a joint military operation with Indonesia 
along the border to destroy the OPM. One month later, in September, 1978, the Papua 
New Guinea Government arrested and jailed the leader of the OPM, Seth Rumkorem 
and his deputy, Jacob Prai2. In 1985, the Papua New Guinea Government, as Premdas 
observed, had employed what he called "aggressive posture against the OPM" which 
covered returning refugees, searching the OPM house to house and military patrols 
along the border3. In the same year, the Government had arrested the OPM leaders, 
monitored the activities of known sympathisers, and conducted its own military operation 
against the OPM4.
However, this has not brought about the destruction of the OPM. Although Papua New
*May, "East of the Border", in Between Two Nations: p.92. 
^yam ekye and Premdas, "P.N.G. Indonesia Relations", p.37 and 43. 
R em das, "Continuity and Change", p.72.
Indonesian Reports. 11th May - 3rd June, 1985.
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Guinea conducted regular border patrols, the number of PNGDF troops deployed have 
not been large. In the early 1980s when there were some reports of OPM activities 
there were only two border patrols each year1. Therefore the OPM still survives and 
attacks Indonesia from Papua New Guinea side of the border, and Indonesian violates 
the border to pursue the OPM. For example, in April, 1988, the OPM attacked a 
transmigrasi settlement at Arso, and Indonesian troops crossed the border to pursue the 
OPM guerillas into Papua New Guinea territory. Indonesian troops stayed there for 
three weeks and withdrew after they made contact with the PNGDF patrol.2
This situation created tension at the border and affected the relationship between the two 
countries. Either side accused each other. Indonesia accused Papua New Guinea of not 
respecting the Border Agreement because they let the OPM find sanctuary in its 
territory. On the other hand, Papua New Guinea accused Indonesia of violating this 
agreement because of the Indonesian border incursions. It is obvious that the border 
situations was influenced by the Papua New Guinea Government’s action or policy 
towards the OPM. So far, the Papua New Guinea Government’s policy not to support 
the OPM has succeeded to maintain its relationship with Indonesia, but the border 
problem still exists.
In addition, Papua New Guinea’s action to refugees may give rise to border tensions. 
According to the Papua New Guinea Government, a ‘refugee’ is "person who has left his 
or her country of origin, and is unwilling to return because o f what our Government 
judges to be a justifiable fear o f persecution for reasons o f political opinion."* The 
Government allows these refugees to remain as permissive residents if they show that
lPeter Hastings, "Defence Under Attack", EEER» 23rd June, 1984, p.45.
'"Niugini Nuis. November 4,1988, as cited by Hegarty, "PNG in 1988. Political Crossroads?", Asian 
Survey. VolJOGX, No.2 (February, 1989):p.l85.
^PNGFAR. December, 1985, p.34.
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they are likely to suffer persecution by returning to Irian Jaya. They may not engage in 
any political activity. But amongst these refugees are some leaders of the OPM who 
are using Papua New Guinea as a base for operations against the Indonesian 
Government. This would lead to a confrontation as Papua New Guinea will not return 
these people to Indonesia. The Government allows them to remain in Papua New 
Guinea until acceptable arrangements can be made for them to be resettled in a third 
country. But refugees who fled across the border without any political reason will be 
returned to Indonesia. And for the people who want to return to Indonesia, the Papua 
New Guinea Government has asked Indonesia’s insistence to guarantee their safety on 
their return1.
However, such a policy is not strong enough to appease Indonesian concern. Indonesia 
is worried that the Papua New Guinea policy on refugees would promote future 
problems for Indonesia. Firstly, it is possible that refugeesi who had been given 
permissive residence by Papua New Guinea may continue to support the OPM’s idea for 
independence, although they have given a guarantee not to engage in political activity. 
Most of the Irianese in Port Moresby who have already become Papuan New Guinea 
citizens have sympathy for the OPM2.
Secondly, OPM leaders who stay in a third country might to give moral support to the 
OPM movement to fight Indonesia and to make propaganda for their struggle abroad. 
Indonesia wants them to repatriate to Irian Jaya and face the consequences of their 
actions against Indonesia. Thirdly, the refugees, who cross the border, because of a 
campaign of fear by the OPM and Indonesia military operations, may become bases for 
the OPM. Therefore, Indonesia wants the Papuan New Guinea Government to repatriate
^bid.. see also J.D.B. Miller, "PNG in World Politics", Australian Overlook. VoL27, No.2 (August, 
1973): p.193; see also Tempo. 9th June, 1984, p.16.
*Ibid.. p.13.
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all refugees to Irian Jaya, not only because of the above concerns, but also because the 
consider these refugees to be Indonesian citizens. Further, in Indonesia’s view the 
repatriation of all refugees to Irian Jaya will decrease the border crossings.
Unfortunately, the Papua New Guinea Government faces obstacles in fulfilling 
Indonesia’s claim. There is opposition within the Government which, probably due to 
their interest and popularity, will oppose the Papua New Guinea policy to destroy the 
OPM and repatriate all of the refugees. This restrains the Government from going 
further as the Opposition may shake the Government’s credibility. For example, the 
deportation of October 1985 generated a revolt within the Somare Cabinet1. Obviously 
the opposition in the Papua New Guinea Government may not cause border tensions 
directly, but it is this opposition which may influence Papua New Guinea Policy which 
causes border tensions. While Indonesia would like the Papua New Guinea Government 
to take a stronger stand with problems regarding the border it understand the difficulties 
facing the Papua New Guinea Government.
In conclusion, it can be seen that one of the main factors which caused border tensions 
on the Papua New Guinea side is the ethnic relationship between Melanesian people in 
Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea. This ethnic relationship has stimulated Papua New 
Guinea’s concern about the fate of their ‘brothers’ in Irian Jaya. This feeling, together 
with the fears of Indonesia policies and action, for example, the transmigrasi programme 
and border incursions create a misunderstanding between the two countries.
The ethnic relationship is a main reason for some groups within Papua New Guinea 
(mainly the Opposition) to oppose or criticise Papua New Guinea’s policy towards the 
OPM and the refugees. Therefore, Papua New Guinea policy or action towards border
*Mc Donald, "A long, slow process", HHHk. 27 March 1986, p.26; see also Ian Andrews, "Rumpus Over 
Refugees", ibid., p.36-37.
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issues are not strong enough to help overcome border tensions. Consequently, border 
tensions between the two countries still continue.
Thus, both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have causes which contribute to border 
tensions. So far, the escalation of the border tensions has been avoided due to steps 
taken by both countries to reduce tensions.
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CHAPTER 4
APPROACHES TO TENSION REDUCTION
The previous chapter examined the border problem and the issues which caused border 
tensions both from Indonesia’s and Papua New Guinea’s viewpoint. Both countries have 
tried approaches to overcome these tensions such as legal instruments, diplomacy, and 
the use of a third party. However, all of these approaches need to be evaluated to 
assess how effective they are in overcoming, or at least reducing, these border tensions.
Before examining each approach, it is useful to recognise which are ‘physical’ and 
‘psychological’ problems associated with the overall border problems.
The refugees; the border incursions; and the OPM are physical problems which need to 
be handled immediately by both countries as they directly affect border tensions. Both 
countries have tried various approaches to overcome these problems such as the Border 
Agreement; the Role of a Third Party (Australia and the United Nations High 
Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)); and a Joint Border Patrol. •
The ethnic relationship and the fear of an Indonesian ‘invasion’ are psychological 
problems which need time and patience to overcome. If the physical problem is 
overcome then the psychological problem can be handled more easily as they are inter­
related. The flow of refugees make their ‘Melanesian solidarity’ stronger, and the 
border incursions by Indonesian troops or helicopters have stimulated fears in Papua 
New Guinea of an Indonesian ‘invasion’.
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4.1 THE BORDER AGREEMENT
In international relations, a border agreement is generally an attempt to overcome a 
border problem. It is usually concerned with the delineation of the border. Indonesia 
and Papua New Guinea have solved border delineation and administration problems. In 
1973 Indonesia and Australia, on behalf of Papua New Guinea, signed the Border 
Agreement and the Border Administration. In the first Agreement, 14 border markers 
were established and in the latter, administrative border arrangements have been 
managed (see Appendices I and II). According to Article 13 of this Agreement, the 
Agreement will be reviewed five years from the date of ratification.
After Papua New Guinea’s Independence in 1975 the two countries reviewed the 
Agreement and signed the Basic Agreement on Border Administration in 1979 and 1984. 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea formulated new important articles in these Agreements 
in order to establish more communication between the two countries with regard to the 
border problem, such as: the Joint Border Committee (Article 2 of the Basic Agreement 
1979 and 1984); and the Exchange Information on Major Construction (Article 14 of the 
Basic Agreement 1984). According to Article 2, the Joint Border Committee (JBQ 
should consist of senior officials of both Governments. This Committee "shall formulate 
guidelines and procedures for the effective implementation of this Agreement" and "shall, 
as appropriate, advise and make recommendations to their respective Government on all 
matters..." Further, this Committee shall meet at least once a year as well as when 
necessary, upon request of either Government (see Appendix II).
Furthermore, as with the Border Agreement of 1973, in the Basic Agreement of 1979, 
the Article concerning the Liaison Arrangement still existed which stressed assistance to 
the JBC. This article stated that two liaison meetings should be established: first, a 
level of primary liaison, between officials from Jakarta and Irian Jay a and officials from
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Port Moresby and the Western and West Sepik Provinces: and second, a level of 
secondary liaison between officials of the Kabupaten or Kecamatan in Irian Jaya and 
their counterparts in the districts in Papua New Guinea. The aim of these liaison 
meetings are as follows: to exchange information, to facilitate the practical operation, to 
ensure that both governments through the JBC are kept informed of significant 
developments relating to the border areas: and to consider local technical or development 
matters affecting border communities. Meeting are held at intervals not exceeding two 
months (see Appendix II).
Another new article is the Exchange of Information or Major Construction related to 
Border Development on both sides. According to Article 14, the two Governments shall 
keep each other informed of any major constructions (roads, dams, bridges, aerodromes) 
within a five kilometre zone on either side of the border. The imbalance of the 
development along the border will attract border crossers from one side to the other.
So far, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have succeeded in achieving the Basic 
Agreement on Border Administration. In addition, the countries have signed four 
Memoranda of Understanding in Port Moresby on August 4, 1982, as follows:
1. Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the JBC;
2. Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a radio circuit;
3. Memorandum of Understanding on the survey and demarcation of the 
international border,
4. Special management on traditional and customary border crossings1.
Since 1982 there has been an Annual Joint Border Committee Meeting together with
Donald Nangoi, "Indonesia-PNG Relations", The Indonesian Quarterly. VoLX, No.4, (October 1982): p.8.
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irregular meetings of the Border Liaison Committee. The two Governments have 
established a ‘hot line* between Jayapura and Vanimo. In the context of border survey 
and demarcation since 1983, the two countries have agreed to a joint survey of the 
entire border including placement of new markers for clearer definition of the border. 
By 1985, the placement of border markers had been completed between Bensbach and 
the Fly River Bridge and this would continue up to the northern side1.
However, the extent to which these mechanisms are effective in handling the border 
problem need to be evaluated. In order to know the effectiveness of the various legal 
instruments, it is important to estimate the situation at the border. It seems that 
Reviews were required in 1973, 1979 and 1984 due to border problems.
In 1977 and 1978 refugees crossed the border and border violations occurred. For 
example, hundreds of Irianese crossed the border into Papua New Guinea territory due 
to the intensification of conflict between the OPM and Indonesian military forces in the 
period leading up to Indonesia’s national elections2. There were also reports that Papua 
New Guinean villagers were shot by an Indonesian patrol on the Papua New Guinean 
side of the border3. In 1978, there were major incursions by Indonesia in the border 
area while searching for the OPM who crossed the border into Papua New Guinea to 
avoid Indonesian military operations4. In this period the Indonesian and Papua New 
Guinean relationship deteriorated because of these incidents. In order to prevent further 
deterioration of relations, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea changed their policy. 
Indonesia scaled down military operations and Papua New Guinea carried out a ‘tougher
^NGFAR. December, 1985, p.38.
2Canberra Times. 20th October, 1981, quoted in May, "East Border", in Between Two Nations: p.95.
V ost Courier. 30 May, 1977, quoted in May, idem, p.95.
^bid.. 22, 23 June, 1978, quoted in May, idem, p.95.
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line’ policy towards the OPM as stated earlier. These developments resulted in the 
signing of the Basic Agreement of 1979.
Similarly, the situation in the border area between 1979 and 1984 warranted Indonesia 
and Papua New Guinea reviewing the Basic Agreement in 1979. In this period, there 
was an upsurge of OPM activities within Irian Jaya during 1981 and their activities 
escalated1. There was also an increase in the number of border crossings. Further, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1 there were several border violations by Indonesia in 1981, 1982 
and 1983. The most important development which caused border tensions was the 
influx of refugees who crossed the border into Papua New Guinea in February, 1984. 
After this development, Indonesia made some efforts to ensure that her relationship with 
Papua New Guinea did not deteriorate. For example, Vice President Umar 
Wirahadikusumah and his entourage visited the far eastern province to view the situation 
for themselves. These efforts to maintain a good relationship has led to the achievement 
of the Basic Agreement in October, 19842.
It is clear that the Border Agreement is not a guarantee that the border problem can be 
overcome totally. The existence of the OPM sanctuaries and the border violations by 
Indonesia in the periods before and after 1979 have shown that the Border Agreement 
could not prevent situations from occurring, although there is an article for security 
which states that either side should not allow their respective border areas to be used for 
hostile activities (see Appendix II).
However, there are some mechanisms which maintain communications between the two 
countries to discuss border problems and this prevents further deterioration of their
Canberra Times. 20 October, 1981, quoted in May, idem, p.105.
2Ian Bell, Herb Feith, and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge", p.551.
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relationship. There are the JBC, and the Border Liaison. In his speech on the occasion 
of the signing of the Revised Basic Agreement, Namaliu said that the JBC and the 
Border Liaison have greatly contributed to the effective administration of the border.
On the other hand, May argued that the machinery of the border liaison was generally 
ineffective. He gave an example of the flow of refugees in February, 1984 and observed 
that Indonesian officials did not know anything about the problem in Jayapura regarding 
the situation there as ‘normal’. This was in spite of the fact that residents on the Papua 
New Guinea side of the border confirmed that Jayapura was in darkness and its 
government radio station silent At that time there had not been a border liaison 
meeting for over a year, and the ‘hot line’ of Jayapura and Vanimo "had been out o f 
service" for several months1.
It may be that what May observed was because there had not been a border liaison 
meeting for one year, and the ‘hot line’ of Jayapura and Vanimo had been out of 
service for several months. So when the flow of refugees occurred in February, 1984, 
Papua New Guinea initiated a special border liaison meeting between officials of both 
countries to discuss the problem. In the meeting, they discussed the improvement of 
communication links between Vanimo (Papua New Guinea) and Jayapura. Although the 
two delegations failed to reach an agreement on the future of the border crossings, this 
meeting showed that they can communicate with each other, which is an important 
factor in maintaining their relationship2.
An evaluation of the effectiveness of the JBC and the Border Liaison depends on what 
people expect from this committee. If people expect that the Committee can overcome
^ a y ,  "Mutual Respect", p.52. 
TNGFAR. March, 1984, p.8.
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the border problem quickly and decisively, the JBC and the Border Liaison functions 
can be regarded as not too effective. For example, the JBC meeting in Bandung broke 
up after 4 days, because of the failure to achieve an agreement on the proposals for 
joint search and rescue operation in the border area1. But, if people expect that the 
committee and the Border Liaison is a mechanism for the two countries to communicate 
and to avoid further escalation of border situation, then the committee is effective. It is 
worth noting that it is better to have a mechanism to communicate which may prevent 
an increase of tension than to have nothing.
It should be remembered that the JBC is not only a useful means for communication, 
but also for Survey and Demarcation and Procedure together with a procedure for the 
implementation of subsidiary arrangements, such as a technical sub committee, and 
detailed arrangements for traditional border crossers. These have been negotiated and 
agreed upon at the JBC meetings2.
Moreover, the Article on the Exchange Information of Major Constructions as stated 
earlier may be useful to control border development for as Yusuf Wanandi stated "The 
aim was to prevent large scale migration, which will otherwise certainly create severe 
problems for both sides"3. With regard to the exchange of information on border 
development, Papua New Guinea informed Indonesia that approximately K1 million was 
spent in 1983 on this project and the same amount is expected to be spent this year 
(1984). Similarly, Indonesia informed Papua New Guinea that they had spent an 
equivalent amount on Border Development4. Further, although border development on
‘May, "Mutual Respect", p.52
VNGFAR. March, 1984, p.9. 
^Wanandi, "Indonesian’s View", p.92. 
*PNGFAR. March, 1984, p.10.
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both sides has not had much progress1 in preventing border crossings the exchange of 
information seems to be respected by both countries.
So, it can be seen that Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have tried to overcome the 
‘physical’ problem, such as border violations, border crossers, border development, and 
the OPM, by various legal instruments. These instruments are effective in reducing 
border tensions but do not overcome the border problems completely. The influx of 
12,000 refugees in 1984 gave rise to another problem for the two countries, which needs 
a totally new approach. A third party may be of value in reducing tensions; that is 
Australia and the UNHCR.
42  THIRD PARTY : AUSTRALIA AND THE UNHCR
4.2.1 Australia
Besides the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean efforts, Australia could be expected to 
play a role in reducing border tensions. Ziegler discovered that there were several 
functions for a third party, e.g., provide good offices and a neutral place for disputants 
to meet, and to delay any action until tempers have cooled2.
In the case of the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problem, Australia would 
be a useful third party. In the context of refugees, Australia could suggest that Papua 
New Guinea employ a hard line towards the refugees. It can be seen from what Bill 
Hayden has advised in Port Moresby that Papua New Guinea was "to adopt proper 
screening procedures, identify the real refugees, separate the OPM activities from the
lMay, "Mutual Respect", p.51.
^ a v id  Ziegler, War Peace and International Politics.froronto: Little Brown and Company, 1987), p.298- 
301.
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other border crossers and create the condition for these people to go back to Indonesia"l.
Further, according to Babbage, in terms of a possible escalation of border tensions, 
Australia may counsel Papua New Guinea to carry out stronger measures to prevent 
illegal border crossers to avoid conflict with Indonesia. On the other hand Australia 
could approach Jakarta to have patience with Port Moresby2.
But instead of reducing tensions, if Papua New Guinea’s relies on Australia’s defence to 
deter Indonesia’s policy on border issues, it would escalate the problem. Further, a 
possible establishment of a Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty between Papua 
New Guinea and Australia would also escalate the tensions.
4,2.2 The Involvement of the UNHCR.
According to David W. Ziegler, "the UN’s contributions to peace are similar to those of 
third parties in disputes... One thing a third party can do is provide good offices 
Thus, in the case of refugees, one of the areas in which the United Nations can 
contribute is with supervision and observation.
Before 1984, both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea had similar views on a solution to 
overcome the border crossings without the involvement of the UNHCR. Indonesia 
wanted to keep the UNHCR out of the border crossers problem. Indonesia regarded that 
border crossers are an internal affair and opposed internationalisation of this problem. 
In Indonesia’s view, the involvement of the UNHCR is an admittance to the fact that
^udiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.103. 
‘“'Babbage, The Dilemma, p.10.
R e g le r ,  War and Peace, p.323.
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these were refugees rather than border crossers.
Similarly, Papua New Guinea was reluctant to refer to border crossers as refugees, 
because they regarded them as Indonesian citizens who should be returned to their 
original abodes. Prime Minister Somare stated that Papua New Guinea did not want the 
UNHCR to be involved in the refugee problem because Papua New Guinea was not a 
party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees, 
and therefore, Papua New Guinea was not subject to the provisions of this international 
agreement1.
However, the inflow of refugees in 1984 caused a change of policy. It is fact that 
before 1984 both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea were able to overcome the border 
crossing problem, as the numbers were small. So, the UNHCR was not needed to solve 
the problem. But the problem became too big for the two countries to solve when the 
number of refugees increased alarmingly. For Indonesia, the camps housing the border 
crossers became potential bases for the OPM to act against Indonesia. For Papua New 
Guinea, besides the cost problem, the criticism of The Opposition together with public 
opinion put Papua New Guinea in a difficult situation when making decisions on the 
refugee problem.
It was not surprising that when Paias Wingti came to power in late 1985, he 
implemented a new policy concerning the border crossers. He insisted on the 
involvement of the UNHCR in screening the refugees, supervising repatriation and 
administering and caring for the refugees in the camps on the Papua New Guinea side 
of the border. And therefore, in January, 1986, the Papua New Guinean Government 
signed the United Nations Convention of Refugees and the Protocol Relating to the
^NGFAR. December, 1984, p.24.
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Status of Refugees1.
Meanwhile, Wingti tried to persuade Indonesia to agree that the UNHCR should have a 
role in determining the status of the border crossers. In February, 1986, in a joint 
communique, the Indonesian Government declared that it "respected Papua New 
Guinea’s decision to assign a greater role to the UNHCR on its territory"2. It seemed 
that Indonesia secured "a quid pro quo” for the involvement of the UNHCR with a 
Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-operation which was signed on 27th 
October, 1986 (see Appendix V)3.
The official view of both the Papua New Guinea and the Indonesian Governments is 
that the involvement of the UNHCR in looking after the border crossers is a positive 
move. The Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Namaliu stated that the new policy 
"would contribute positively towards stabilising the border situation, and provide a better 
climate for cross border arrangements."4 Similarly, the Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja noted the constructive effort being taken by the Papua New 
Guinean Government under the new policy "to improve border security, border camp 
management, and more cost effective delivery o f humanitarian assistance to border 
camps".5
lWolfers, "Mutual Respect", in Bevond the Borden p.34.
2Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.104.
3Colin Brown, "Indonesia, the Southwest Pacific and Australia", World Review. Vol.27, No.2, June, 
1988:p.46.
*PNGFAR. March, 1986, p.17.
5Ibid.
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It might be true that the involvement of the UNHCR is a positive approach in handling 
the refugee problem. To look after the refugees a substantial amount of money is 
required which the Papua New Guinea Government does not have. The involvement of 
the UNHCR can handle this finance problem. In fact, the UNHCR has provided almost 
K2 million (in 1985), K2 million (in 1986), K3 million (in 1987)1 to the Papua New 
Guinea Government to assist refugees. Without the financial support of the UNHCR, it 
is difficult for Papua New Guinea to maintain the large number of refugees. The lack 
of a budget for Papua New Guinea to look after and repatriate the refugees may cause 
the unhealthy conditions for these refugees, such as death, sickness etc. This situation 
may stimulate criticism from The Opposition and the public within Papua New Guinea 
which could lead to the loss of office, as happened to the Somare Government. This, in 
turn, may cause the Papua New Guinea Government to adopt a ‘less tough policy’ 
which would stimulate border crossers.
Moreover, the involvement of the UNHCR may stabilise the border situation because 
they have resources to build refugee camps long distances from the border. For 
example, the East Awin Camp in Western Province2. This situation would create and 
improve the security and administration of the border. In the case of security, the 
placing of refugee camps far away from the border might prevent the OPM from 
exploiting the refugees. In the context of administration, the reduction of refugee camps 
would make these camps easier to manage and more efficient for the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance3. However, Foreign Minister Vagi rightly said that "relocation 
should be a temporary measure until screening had determined who should return to go
^NGFAR. December. 1985, p.37; Sinar Pembaruan. 10 Maret 1987.
2ibid.. March, 1986, p.17; see also Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.105.
3ibid.. March, 1986, p.12.
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home"1.
With the UNHCR implementing the repatriation, it is most probable that the repatriation 
would be accepted more readily than if either Indonesia or Papua New Guinea 
implemented it. For example, when Indonesia and Papua New Guinea’s team visited the 
West Sepik Province as a first step in the implementation of the proposed repatriation 
programme, there was a violent and unprovoked demonstration by some of the border 
crossers in the Blackwater Camp near Vanimo2. By mid January, 1986 the UNHCR 
announced that "it believed up to one third o f the Irianese then in PNG - probably 
around 10,000 in number - were ready to return home, and another one third would 
return if their safety could be guaranteed"3.
However, the UNHCR faced obstacles in repatriation of the refugees. Although the 
programme should have commenced in 1986, by March, 1988, only 2,000 refugees had 
actually been moved4. By 1987 there were still 10,029 refugees in Papua New Guinea 
refugees camps; only 1,295 refugees had returned to Irian Jaya5. The reluctance of 
Indonesia to allow the UNHCR to monitor homecomings as an essential prerequisite for 
a voluntary repatriation programme has become an obstacle to the repatriation of 
refugees. In addition, new arrivals of border crossers on the Papua New Guinea side of 
the border have continued. For example, in September, 1986, a group of 747 Irianese 
arrived in West Sepik and they told Papua New Guinean officials that six or seven
^udiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.105.
2£NGFAR, December, 1984, p.22; see also Tempo. 17 November, 1984.
hlrown. "The Southwest Pacific", p.46.
4Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.105.
5Sinar Pembaruan. 10 Maret, 1987, the numbers of refugees was given by PNG Ambassador, Erian Amin 
in Jakarta.
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hundred more people were waiting to cross. They complained about maltreatment by 
Indonesian troops1.
Furthermore, although the UNHCR did not make any progress in finding third country 
asylum for Irianese refugees, in August 1986, at least five guerilla leaders who gave up 
the struggle -James Nyaro, Alex Derry, Gerardus Thorny, Ries Wyder and David 
Titiemka - were resettled in Ghana in August, 19862. Although the resettlement of the 
OPM leaders in a third country may give rise to problems in the future for the time 
being it will influence the OPM activities which should lead to reduced border tensions.
Obviously, to some extent the involvement of the UNHCR is effective in reducing 
border tensions in terms of security and administration which prevents further possible 
tensions. Actually the UNHCR would be effective in repatriating the refugees if there 
were no obstacles in implementing it. Thus, the most effective way to handle the 
refugees would be to deal with the root problem which caused the rise of refugees.
Meanwhile Indonesia is trying to overcome the cause of the border problems, that is the 
OPM. To eliminate the OPM, Indonesia needs Papua New Guinea’s co-operation. 
Indonesia is anxious to invite Papua New Guinea to have a Joint Border Patrol. In 
Indonesia’s view, a joint border patrol is the most effective way to flush out the OPM.
^udiardjo and Liem, W est Papua, p.101.
2Ibid.. p.105.
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43  A JOINT BORDER PATROL
For Indonesia, a joint border patrol would be as effective in destroying the OPM as the 
Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur Joint Border Patrol was in eliminating the Communist insurgence 
in North Kalimantan. Indonesia and Malaysia have carried out ‘search and destroy’ 
operation, and ‘hot pursuit’ rights in respect of each other’s territory. Besides, 
Indonesia regarded a Joint Border Patrol as coming under the provisions of Article 9 of 
the 1979 Agreement that emphasises the importance of close co-operation with one 
another.
However, Papua New Guinea has refused repeated requests for a Joint Border Patrol. In 
his statement released in October, 1985, Father John Momis of the Melanesian Alliance 
Party emphasised that "there will be no pursuit by either the Indonesian military or 
security forces into our territory"1. Therefore, it was no surprise that the JBC meeting 
held in Bandung in October, 1986 broke up due to the failure to reach agreement on 
proposals for a joint search and rescue operation in the border area. Papua New Guinea 
refused these proposals.
Obviously Papua New Guinea did not accept a Joint Border Patrol as a solution to 
eliminate the OPM. May observed that there were two reasons why Papua New Guinea 
resisted the Indonesian request. First, it is politically impossible to have a Joint Border 
Patrol because any government that agreed to it would lose office. Secondly, the 
Jakarta/Kuala Lumpur Joint Border Patrol was not a model that could be applied in the 
Papua New Guinea/Indonesia case because of the difficulty in distinguishing between 
Indonesia Melanesians and Papua New Guinea Melanesians2. In the case of the
^NGFAR. December, 1985, p.35.
^ a y .  "East Border", in Between Two Nations: p.225-226.
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Jakarta/Kuala Lumpur - Joint Patrol it was easy to recognise Chinese Communist 
terrorists among the Malays.
May might be right when he commented on the possibility of losing office because 
when in June - July, 1978 Papua New Guinea and Indonesia held the Joint Military 
Operation along the border to eliminate the OPM, it caused so much debate and anxiety 
that Papua New Guinea would be reluctant to repeat it again. It seems then that the 
ethnic relationships between Papua New Guineans and the Melanesians in Irian Jay a 
prevented the Papua New Guinean Government from accepting the Indonesian request.
Another obstacle in having a Joint Border Patrol is that Papua New Guinea does not see 
the OPM as a proscribed organisation and consequently is rarely prepared to deploy 
troops against it. Papua New Guinea does not see the OPM as a significant threat to 
their security. Therefore they do not want to deploy their Defence Force to the border1. 
Thus, the absence of a common perception of threat has become an obstacle in 
establishing a Joint Border Patrol. It is different with the Jakarta - Kuala Lumpur Joint 
Border Patrol. They could co-operate with each other, because they perceived a common 
enemy2.
So, a solution of a Joint Border Patrol between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is not 
a viable proposition, although this approach may be effective. Up to now, Indonesia 
and Papua New Guinea have not found an approach that would effectively eliminate the 
OPM at the border area. It seems, in relation to the OPM, that the Treaty of Mutual 
Respect, Friendship and Co-operation is not too meaningful when handling this problem. 
The OPM still resides in Papua New Guinea and the border incursions by Indonesian
interview with David Hegarty in March, 1989. 
Hastings, "Irian Jaya Border Problem", p.51.
76
troops still occur up until 1988.
It is clear that the approaches such as the Border Agreement and the involvement of a 
third party is effective in reducing border tensions and in preventing further escalations 
of border situations. It is true that these approaches cannot totally overcome the 
physical problem, because border incursions, border crossers or refugees still continue, 
and the OPM still exists.
On the other hand, there are the psychological problems, mainly on the Papua New 
Guinean side which need to be overcome, because it will influence the Papua New 
Guinea policy and action and in turn, lead to border tensions. To overcome the 
psychological problem, both sides need to understand each other which can be obtained
not by legal instruments, but other instruments dealing with diplomacy, such as personal
\
contact, bilateral forums and regional co-operation.
4.4 PERSONAL CONTACTS
In order to understand the importance of personal contacts in approaches to reducing 
border tensions, it is useful to know the value of diplomacy in preventing conflict 
between the two countries. According to David W. Ziegler, diplomacy is "the process 
of talking over differences, clarifying aims, and exploring adjustments short o f fighting", 
and "the emphasis in diplomacy is on communication"l.
Accordingly, diplomacy is an important instrument for Indonesia and Papua New Guinea 
to communicate their differences and their aims. It is a fact that there are differences in 
their history, culture and political system, which each other needs to understand,
^ a v id  W. Ziegler, War and Peace, p.277.
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especially with regard to the border problem. The lack of understanding about these 
differences gives rise to misunderstandings on both sides. On the one hand, the lack of 
sensitivity and knowledge of Indonesia about the local people in Irian Jaya has caused 
misunderstanding with some groups within Papua New Guinea. These groups are 
concerned that the Melanesian culture will disappear. On the other hand the lack of 
understanding about the Indonesian history, culture and their perception of security have 
given rise to the fear of Indonesian ‘expansion’ on the part of some Papua New 
Guineans. Clearly, it is important for the two countries to communicate with each other 
in order to handle this misunderstanding.
In relation to diplomacy as a communication instrument, Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea have had numerous exchange visits by political leaders to consolidate the 
Indonesian and Papua New Guinean relationship. There were meetings of the two 
Heads of Government in January, 1987, June, 1979, and December, 1980. There were 
also meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the two Governments in May and December, 
1978, in April and October, 1984, in February 1986, and in March, 1987. In addition, 
there have been frequent contacts at an official level. For example, between March and 
June, 1984, a large number of government figures visited the far eastern province to see 
the situation for themselves, such as: Vice President Umar Wirahadikusumah, Internal 
Minister Supardjo Rustam, Leaders of the Legal Aid Institute1. In March, 1987 the head 
of the Papua New Guinean Parliament, Brown Sinamoi visited Indonesia2.
All of these personal contacts have created communication between Indonesia and Papua 
New Guinea and given them a chance to explain their position. In the meetings 
between the two heads of Parliament and the two Foreign Ministers many issues were
han Bell, Herb Feith and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge", p.551.
2Sinar Pern banian. 23 Maret, 1987.
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raised including bilateral issues with regard to the border problem. These meetings led 
to the achievement of the Basic Agreement on Border Arrangement as mentioned earlier. 
Further, in these meetings, Indonesia reiterated her position regarding the question of 
East Timor and stressed that Indonesia had never had any territorial ambitions1.
However, how far are these personal contacts useful in creating understanding and 
reducing border tensions? It seems, these meetings and exchange of visits have not 
been very effective in creating understanding with some groups within Papua New 
Guinea especially The Opposition. It was shown by their opinion towards the Treaty of 
Mutual Respect, Friendship, Co-operation. Some Opposition members described the 
treaty as ‘naive and misconstrued’, ‘sinister’ and an ‘exercise in hypocrisy'2. Obviously 
this group is still suspicious about Indonesia’s intention towards Papua New Guinea.
However, one may argue that the frequent personal contacts are effective in fostering the 
understanding of the Papua New Guinea Government which was shown when Prime 
Minister Paias Wingti stated that the treaty "would give direction for the future and 
inspire confidence in Papua New Guinea and its regional neighbour"3 4. Further, the 
Papua New Guinea Government has appreciated Indonesia’s position on East Timor as a 
domestic affair of Indonesia in a speech by Prime Minister Somare in 1977*.
But the need to create understanding became important when another approach had to be 
found when the influx of refugees occurred in 1984. Indonesia and Papua New Guinea 
need another forum to communicate which involves other groups from different
!See appendices of Joint Communiques/Statements o f Indonesia and PNG in Bevond the Border,
^ o s t  Courier. 29 October 1986, quoted in May, "Mutual Respect", p.44.
3Niugini Nuis. 28 October, 1986, quoted in idem.
4 _. T . . .____r .______. ___I r>_____vt , ~ tha, OorH* « 127
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disciplines, that is a bilateral forum.
4.5 BILATERAL FORUM
The decision to hold a bilateral seminar as a forum to communicate arose from the 
meeting of the two Foreign Ministers of Governments (Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and 
Rabbie T. Namaliu) in April, 1984. It appears that the flow of refugees in February, 
1984 which attracted international attention gave rise to this idea. The first seminar 
held in Port Moresby on 20th and 21st July, 1984, was attended by academics, 
government officials, journalists, and other experts and leaders from the two countries.
The involvement of various kinds of experts showed that Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea realised that to overcome the border problem, especially the psychological 
problem, a forum with broader participation was required. The effectiveness of personal 
contacts has only achieved contact between the officials at a high level in the Papua 
New Guinea Government This approach did not reach other groups that actually play 
an important role in creating tensions between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. For 
example, some groups who opposed the government’s border policy came from local 
and foreign university students, lecturers and journalists in Port Moresby1. In the case 
of journalists, the news that they wrote about the border crossers, or about the deaths in 
refugee camps, may attract public sentiment towards the Papua New Guinean policy on 
refugees.
Therefore, it was important to have a forum that involved some people who came from 
different disciplines to create mutual understanding amongst them. In this forum, 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea were discussing issues frankly and openly. For
R em d a s , "Over Irian Jay a Border", p.47.
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example, on the one hand Indonesia explained that the Indonesian ‘Transmigrasi’ Policy 
does not mean to make the Melanesian culture disappear and Indonesia does not have 
any territorial ambitions. As Mochtar Kusumaatmadja assured his listeners, "It will be 
sheer madness if we had territorial ambitions on Papua New Guinea. You should have no 
concern for this."1. On the other hand Papua New Guineans were talking about the 
ethnic relationship between the Melanesian people in Irian Jaya and the Papua New 
Guineans, explaining the Melanesian culture, and asking that • Indonesia protect their 
culture and their interest. They felt strongly that Indonesia was not doing enough to 
understand the Melanesian culture of Irian Jaya.
There have now been three seminars between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. They 
not only discussed their bilateral interest, but also regional developments. In relation to 
the regional issues, the two countries were discussing South East Asia and ASEAN, 
Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific, Papua New Guinea and Australia. It seems 
that Indonesia and Papua New Guinea are trying to improve their relationship by finding 
a common interest to maintain regional stability either in South East Asia or in the 
South Pacific region.
However, the effectiveness of a bilateral forum to create mutual understanding and trust 
needs to be assessed. Alfred Sasako observed that the Papuan New Guinea - Indonesian 
dialogue in 1984 achieved ‘very little’ because of some misunderstanding about what 
the meeting was all about. The Papua New Guinean side thought that they were there 
to discuss the border issues which caused tension in the Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinean relationship2.
frNGFAR. December. 1985, p.36. 
^bid.. p.35.
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It could to be true that the dialogue of the two countries gave ‘very little’ if the Papuan 
New Guinean side expected too much for a solution to the border problem at this 
forum. The aim of the establishment of this forum was "to foster the kind of 
understanding and mutual trust that appears to have been absent for many years"1.
However, it is too early to estimate how far the Indonesia - Papuan New Guinea 
dialogue can foster mutual understanding and trust Indeed, the Indonesia - Papua New 
Guinea dialogue is not effective in reducing tension in a short time. The border 
tensions still occur. For example, during 1987, there were seven occasions on which 
Indonesia’s troops crossed the border onto Papua New Guinea soil to search for OPM 
guerillas, without first consulting with Papua New Guinea authorities as required under 
the Treaty of Friendship. David Hegarty rightly observed that "Despite the enormous 
turnaround in trust and confidence between Jakarta and Port Moresby that had occurred 
under Wingti, the rise of border security remains a sticking point."1.
In the long term, however, the Indonesian - Papua New Guinea dialogue may be 
effective in reducing border tension when the two countries become more and more 
understanding of each other and what they should do to tackle border problems with 
regard to the physical problems. This may follow with the elimination of the 
psychological problems. For example, on Indonesia’s side, there is an understanding 
that Indonesia should take into account an anthropological approach in the development 
of Irian Jay a. But it would take a long time to see the implementation of this policy. 
In this respect, Papua New Guinea should understand this problem and not be concerned 
about the disappearance of the Melanesian culture.
W
2Hegarty, "Papua New Guinea in 1988, Political Crossroads?", Asian Survey. Vol-XXIX, No.2, (February, 
1989): p.185.
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In addition, the two countries need to implement some efforts to foster mutual 
understanding and to improve their relationship. For example: exchange of visits by 
social and national leaders; exchange of information through the mass media; 
conferences; as well as the exchange of students and scholars in various disciplines1. 
The Technical Co-operation Agreement which was signed by the two countries in 1979 
needs to be developed. So far Papua New Guinea has sent more than 100 people to 
Indonesia for training in the fields of agriculture, education, health, housing, small 
industry, statistics and social affairs2.
Obviously the effectiveness of the Indonesian - Papua New Guinean dialogue can be 
seen in the long term and will depend on how far physical problem can be tackled.
4.6 PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S MEMBERSHIP OF ASEAN
In order to know the value of ASEAN for Papua New Guinea it is necessary to 
understand the importance of regional co-operation. According to David W. Ziegler, a 
regional organisation will have more success in maintaining peace among the members, 
if they have a common interest. They may have similarities or similar problems which 
make them understand regional disputes better, and help to find an appropriate solution3. 
So, in this context Papua New Guinea may have benefit as an ASEAN member.
The idea of Papua New Guinea’s membership of ASEAN was motivated by their hope 
that smoother relations at the border would occur. This idea arose in 1984 when border 
tensions with Indonesia increased. The possibility of Papua New Guinea becoming a
^anandi, "Indonesian Views", p.92.
^rian  K. Amin, "Papua New Guinea Indonesian Bilateral Relations: Problem and Prospects", paper 
presented in Second Indonesian - Papua New Guinean Conference. Jogyakarta, November 9-10, 1985, p.34.
Ziegler, War Peace, p.198.
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member of ASEAN was raised by the Somare Government. As Somare stated in an 
interview given in Honolulu, in February, 1984: "if and when we are invited to join 
ASEAN of course Papua New Guinea will join"1.
However, it took two years before Papua New Guinea formally stated her intention to 
become a member of ASEAN in the 19th Meeting of ASEAN’s Foreign Minister on 23 
and 24th June, 1986 in Manila. In early 1986, Papua New Guinea stated that she 
wanted to sign the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia. This 
statement indicated that Papua New Guinea had become closer to ASEAN. Papua New 
Guinea has attended all ASEAN Conferences since 1976 and in 1981 acquired observer 
status. Further, in 1985 Papua New Guinea was invited to join three ASEAN 
Committees : food, agriculture and forestry, social development and social technology, 
thereby upgrading its status from an observer2.
The idea of Papua New Guinea’s membership of ASEAN as an approach to decrease 
border tensions have been debatable, because it relates to the question of how far Papua 
New Guinea may take advantage of the economic, politic and security interests available 
as a member of ASEAN. In terms of economic interest, Hewison observed with relation 
to trade, access to expertise and investment, Papua New Guinea can be satisfactorily 
organised on a bilateral basis. To increase co-operation Papua New Guinea does not 
have to become an official member of ASEAN3. The similar view was pointed out by 
Robert Igara that "Papuan New Guinea seems unlikely to gain substantial benefit from
Jew ison  et al, "PNG and Membership of ASEAN", Australian Outlook. Vol.39, No.3, (December, 
1985): p.171.
P acific Islands Monthly. July, 1985, p.7.
3Hewison et al, "Membership of ASEAN", p.174.
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intra ASEAN co-operation in trade and industry"l.
While it is probably true that in terms of trade, industry and investment Papua New 
Guinea will not benefit greatly from being a member of ASEAN, it should however be 
considered that there are still some benefits for Papua New Guinea. There would be 
advantages in attempting to co-operate with ASEAN in commodity negotiations aimed at 
improving access to overseas markets and at stabilising prices2. Further, as Peter King 
noted Papua New Guinea can learn from ASEAN expertise and experience in such fields 
as small scale rice production and light manufacture, which would be an excellent way 
to promote long term economic independence3 4. Papua New Guinea will not gain this 
benefit from its trade relationships with Australia, because Australia adopts export 
oriented industrialisation manufactures. Moreover, it should be remembered that there 
are other non member countries which participate in ASEAN -through the ‘dialogue’ 
process, e.g. the US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, EEC (European Economic 
Community) and the United Nations Secretary and Papuan New Guinea may benefit 
from this.
Furthermore, in terms of politic and security factors, Papua New Guinea’s benefit in 
becoming an ASEAN members is debatable as well. As Hewison put it "it is 
questionable whether Papua New Guinea, inside ASEAN, could maintain much 
independence on the issue o f Irian Jaya He further argued that "even if Papua New 
Guinea was to join ASEAN, it seems most unlikely that it would be able to muster
Robert Igara, "PNG’s REgional Environment", Beyond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.72.
2IM .
^eter King, "The ASEAN Connection - For and Against", PNGFAR. July, 1981, p.31.
4Hewison et al., "Membership of ASEAN", p.173.
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sufficient support from other member states to bring pressure to bear on the Indonesian 
regime to soften its hard line approach to the OPM
However Paulius Matane, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Trade, may be right 
when he said that Papua New Guinea can expect that ASEAN will be used as a means 
to promote its foreign policy and explain its position on issues which are common to 
ASEAN countries, including the administration of land boundaries and refugees* 2. For 
example when a border violation by Indonesia occurred in June, 1984, Namaliu raised 
this matter at the 17th Annual Meeting of ASEAN’s Foreign Ministers and hoped that 
every Foreign Minister present understood the matter clearly3. At that time, Papua New 
Guinea still an observer, not a member of ASEAN, was able to raise the question.
The raising of this matter at the ASEAN forum has not overcome the border problem 
but it is possible that as a member of ASEAN, Papua New Guinea may expect that 
other ASEAN members can persuade Indonesia to soften its hard line approach 
regarding the OPM, but not to bring pressure on Indonesia about her policy as Hewison 
stated. This is possible as ASEAN has the basis to solve problems amongst its 
members, as symbolised in the ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Co­
operation in South East Asia. In fact, there are sources of conflicts among ASEAN 
members, such as: Sabah’s claim between the Philippines and Malaysia, Communist 
insurgency and Muslim separatism at the border of southern Thailand and Malaysia, 
where conflict has been avoided. Thus, in this case, Papua New Guinea may hope that 
the rise of the possible conflict between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea will be 
avoided. Moreover, Papua New Guinean membership of ASEAN could make Papua
hbid.. p.174.
2Ibid.. March, 1984, p.8.
3Ibid.. December, 1984, p.20.
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New Guinea feel more secure with regard to the fear of Indonesia’s ‘expansion’. 
ASEAN is a realisation of Indonesia’s good neighbourly policy, so it is unlikely that 
Indonesia will threaten one of its members1.
In addition, Papua New Guinea may play a significant role in creating stability in the 
Southwest Pacific region which is consistent with Papua New Guinea’s objective to 
create stability in the region2. In this respect, the Papua New Guinea’s Membership of 
ASEAN can be used as a bridge between ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum3. A 
close co-operation between ASEAN and South Pacific Forum will lead to stability in 
this region.
It also means close co-operation between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to promote 
their respective interests. To become a member of ASEAN, Papua New Guinea must be 
accepted by all of the members. In this case Indonesia will be trying to persuade other 
ASEAN members to accept Papua New Guinea as a member. On the other hand, 
Indonesia would like to use Papua New Guinea as a "good office" to dilute South 
Pacific support for anti Indonesian rebels. As Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja 
said "ties with Papua New Guinea are needed in order to save Indonesia’s image in the 
South Pacific."4'
It is clear that Papua New Guinea’s membership of ASEAN may reduce border tensions, 
as Papua New Guinea will feel more secure in regarding its fear of an Indonesian
1J. Kusnanto Anggoro, "Masalah Keanggotaan PNG Dalam ASEAN" (The Problem of the PNG’s 
Membership of ASEAN). Suara Karya. 15 July, 1986.
Government of PNG, Foreign Policy, p.43, 59, 114, quoted in Hewison et al. "The Membership of 
ASEAN", p.173.
^Wanandi, "Australia, Indonesia, PNG and the South Pacific", Bevond the Border, ed. Edward P. 
Wolfers: p.122.
4Jakarta Post. 7 February, 1987.
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‘invasion’. This feeling may influence the Papua New Guinea Government to employ a 
‘tougher line’ policy or take action towards border issues which would lead to reduced 
border tensions. Further the success of Papuan New Guinea in diluting the South 
Pacific support for ‘West Papuan self-determination’ will reduce border tensions as 
well. This, in turn, may contribute to regional stability in the South West Pacific 
region.
On the whole, it can be seen that there are still obstacles to implementing the Joint 
Border Patrol and Papuan New Guinea’s membership of ASEAN, although these 
approaches may be effective in reducing border tensions. But other approaches that 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have been trying seem to be effective in reducing 
border tensions. It was proved that the two countries can maintain a good relationship - 
although the border problem still exists.
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CONCLUSION
All of the approaches to tension reduction examined in chapter 4 just deal with 
symptoms of the border problems, not the underlying causes. All of these diplomatic 
and legal mechanisms are meaningless to overcome the border problem totally if the 
parties involved do not deal with the real problem, that is the development policy in 
Irian Jaya. It means Indonesia needs to rethink her policy.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Indonesia has carried out policies to develop Irian Jaya and 
to integrate the province into the Indonesian National Development Policy. But it seems 
the Indonesian Government has carried out the national standard development policy in 
this territory which has given an unintended effect which led to the border problem. 
Moreover, this policy has instigated negative feelings in Papua New Guinea due to the 
ethnic relationship that they have with the people in that part of Irian Jaya.
The Transmigrasi Programme which has been successfully implemented in most other 
areas, has stimulated hostility among the local people in Irian Jaya. Moreover, it has 
incited negative feeling by Papua New Guinea about "the disappearance of Melanesian 
culture" due to Javanese transmigrants.
In addition, regarding the spontaneous immigrants, every Indonesian citizen has the right 
to go anywhere in any other part of Indonesia. It seems in most parts of Indonesia the 
immigrants have to compete in obtaining jobs and other opportunities. In the case of 
Irian Jaya, the immigrants have dominated the opportunities for jobs and education 
which leads to the rise of the local peoples’ dissatisfaction. Indonesia should realise that 
they erred in the development of Irian Jaya but whatever the mistakes it is important
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that Indonesia now corrects the mistake.
As Sabam Siagian said:
"whatever policy mistakes or cases of mismanagement we Indonesians have done during 
the past years in the province, it is not merely rhetorics if I say now, a determination to 
develop the Irian Jaya province in a responsible manner, to correct past mistakes, to be 
more sensitive to local anthropological factors is now visible."1
It is obvious, Indonesia has realised its mistakes by the fact that it is now making an 
enormous effort to correct its mistakes. With regard to the transmigrasi programme, 
there was a team of a social scientists from Gadjah Mada University headed by 
Mubyarto (who visited the province in January, 1985) to survey the effects of the 
transmigrasi programme. Another survey was headed by Kahpie Suriadiredja to do the 
same. Each of these reports suggested that the Indonesian Government had made 
serious mistakes in Irian Jaya and that existing policies needed to be rethought2.
In relation to the development in Irian Jaya there were some efforts to estimate what the 
result of development policy has been. There was the Indonesian Journalist Association 
in 1984 which organised a working seminar on development of Irian Jaya. Indonesian 
anthropologists and social scientists were invited to deliver their thoughtful papers. This 
seminar found that the development of Irian Jaya must be carried out more effectively, 
more responsibly and with an anthropological approach.
The Indonesia military solution, instead of suppressing the OPM, has created fear in the 
Irianese towards Indonesia and stimulated their sympathy to the OPM movement. It is 
true that in the past, Indonesia succeeded by using military force in suppressing 
separatist movements, but in the case of the OPM, it has caused an unintended effect
1 Sabam Siagian, "On Indonesian - Papua New Guinean Bilateral Relations : Some Priorities for a joint 
discussion", paper presented in Second Indonesian - Papua New Guinean Conference. Yogyakarta, November 9- 
10, 1985, p. 5-6.
^an Bell, Herb Feith and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge", p.551.
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which has given rise to the border problem. This is because there is a direct border and 
the ethnic relationship with Papua New Guinea. The OPM takes advantage of this 
condition and crosses the border to avoid Indonesian pursuit and uses scare tactics on 
the village people regarding the Indonesian military and encourages them to cross the 
border as well.
The Indonesian Government did not realise the result of its development policy in Irian 
Jaya until the uprising in Jayapura and the movement of 12,000 refugees who fled 
across the border. Indonesia and Papua New Guinea then made an effort to reduce 
border tension as mentioned earlier. However, the border problem cannot be overcome 
with the approach adopted by the two countries.
It is clear, that Indonesia has realised her mistakes and needs to rethink its approach in 
order to correct these mistakes. The Indonesia Transmigrasi Programme needs be 
implemented with great sensitivity and respect for local culture and interest. The target 
of the Transmigrasi Programme needs to be re-evaluated to consider the condition of the 
areas and the local people as well as the Indonesian Government’s capability to move 
such a large number of people. If the Programme has still not reached its objectives, the 
increase of transmigrants may give rise to the hostility of the local people.
Further, with regard to the development of Irian Jaya it should be considered that a 
large role should be given to the Irianese in the administration of the province. 
Accordingly, the Melanesian should have a role in the decision-making for Irian Jaya.
However, it is too early to see how all of these efforts will be implemented. It takes a 
long time to see the result of a new understanding as mentioned above. Yusuf Wanandi 
rightly said that "to expect that they should immediately change their way of life seem to
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be asking too much ... Irian Jaya cannot be developed overnight"l.
In relation to the OPM, Indonesia has tried to carry out a‘non-military’ policy, but it 
did not work. On the Indonesian side, she tried to carry out a‘smiling policy’ in May, 
1978 when a group of senior Indonesian officials flew by helicopter to a village 
southeast of Jayapura to consult with and to bring medical supplies to people who 
agreed to stop resisting Indonesia. But this mission was responded to by attacks from 
armed villagers who killed two pilots and seven officials were imprisoned by the OPM. 
After this Indonesia increased troop numbers at the border2. It seems armed villagers 
who were OPM sympathisers or members of the OPM prevented "the smiling policy of 
Indonesia". But on the other hand, as stated earlier, the Indonesian military reprisals 
instead of suppressing the OPM have caused fear among the local people.
So, Indonesia needs to rethink her military solution. Less military patrolling and less 
threatening of people at the border may be an appropriate policy to prevent the fears of 
the local people towards Indonesian soldiers. This policy may also avoid "a major 
campaign o f fears by the OPM” to the local people. The military policy is needed to 
protect and defend the security of the local people and the transmigration settlements 
from the OPM.
Clearly Indonesia needs to change her development policy in Irian Jaya to overcome the 
border problem by dealing with the real problem. However, it needs time to see how 
far the changes of policy will take to be carried out.
If Indonesia changes her policy, and the local people accept it, then the border crossings
!Wanandi, "The Indonesian View", in Bevond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers, p.89. 
^ a y ,  "East of the Border", in Between Two Nations: p.100.
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will become less and less, and the OPM will not have basis to move against Indonesia. 
In this case, Indonesia might offer an amnesty policy1 as a possible strategy to invite the 
OPM guerillas to surrender. It is likely that the resolve of the guerillas could weaken 
in view of their lack of material resources, food, medicine, weapons and external 
support
However, Hastings rightly said that "the solution lies not only in changed Government 
attitudes but in the Irianese themselves"1. It means that when the Indonesian
Government changes the development policy in Irian Jaya so that the Irianese would 
have a larger role in administering Irian Jaya, then the Irianese should take this 
opportunity and show that they are capable of administering i t
interview with David Hegarty in March, 1939. 
2The Sydney Morning Herald. July 6, 1989.
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APPENDIX I.
Agreement between Australia and Indonesia concerning 
certain boundaries between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, 
Jakarta, 12 February 1973
AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA
Recognising the desirability o f having boundaries of political and 
physical permanence between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia,
Considering the desirability o f demarcating more precisely in 
certain respects the land boundaries on the island o f New Guinea 
(Irian) as described in Articles I, II, III and IV of the Convention 
between Great Britain and the Netherlands dated the sixteenth day of 
May One thousand eight hundred and ninety-five
Noting the steps taken since then in relation to the demarcation of 
the land boundaries on the island of New Guinea (Irian),
Noting in particular, with appreciation, the work of the Joint 
Survey by the Australian and Indonesian Survey Authorities (in this 
Agreement called "the Joint Survey") in surveying boundaries on the 
island o f New Guinea (Irian) as described in their final report dated 
the twelfth day of February One thousand nine hundred and seventy,
Recalling that in the Agreement between the Australian and 
Indonesian Governments dated the eighteenth day of May One 
thousand nine hundred and seventy-one (in this Agreement called 
"the 1971 Seabed Agreement") the two Governments left for further 
discussion the question of the seabed boundary line between the point 
o f Latitude 9 degrees 24’ 30" South, Longitude 140 degrees 49’ 30” 
East (Point B1 shown on the chart annexed to this Agreement and on 
chart "A ’ annexed to the 1971 Seabed Agreement) and the point at 
which the land boundary between the Territory of Papua and West 
Irian meets the southern coast o f the island o f New Guinea (Irian),
As good neighbours and in a spirit o f friendship and co- operation
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The boundary between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia on the 
island of New Guinea (Irian) shall be more precisely demarcated as 
follows:
(a) In the north the boundary is the meridian o f Longitude 141 
degrees East extending southwards from the point of the 
intersection o f the meridian with the mean low water line on 
the northern coast, located at Latitude 2 degrees 35’ 37” South, 
to the point of its most northerly intersection with the 
waterway ( ‘ thalweg’) o f the Fly River and that meridian shall 
be deemed to lie along the geodesic lines successively linking 
the markers MM1, MM2, MM3, MM4, MM5, MM6, MM7* 
MM8, MM9 and M M  10 established by the Joint Survey and 
indicated on the chart annexed to this Agreement.
(b) From the point of the most northerly intersection o f the 
meridian of Longitude 141 degrees East with the waterway 
( ‘ thalweg’) o f the Fly River (at present located at Latitude 6 
degrees 19 24 South) the boundary lies along that waterway 
to the point o f its most southerly intersection with the meridian 
of Longitude 141 degrees 01’ 10” East (at present located at 
Latitude 6 degrees 53’ 33" South).
(c) From the last-mentioned point the boundary is the meridian of 
Longitude 141 degrees 01’ 10" East extending southwards to 
the point o f Latitude 9 degrees 08’ 08" South (Point B3 shown 
on the chart annexed to this Agreement) and that meridian shall 
be deemed to lie along the geodesic lines successively linking 
the markers MM 11, MM 12, M M  13 and M M  14 established by 
the Joint Survey and indicated on the chart annexed to this 
Agreement.
ARTICLE 2
The Governments of Australia and Indonesia, as soon as 
practicable after the entry into force of this Agreement and at a time 
to be agreed upon by them, shall arrange for aerial or satellite 
photography of that part o f the Fly River referred to in Article 1(b) of
this Agreement. Thereafter, such photography of that part of the Fly 
River shall be arranged periodically at intervals to be agreed upon.
ARTICLE 3
Immediately off the southern coast of the island of New Guinea 
(Irian), the boundary between the area of seabed that is adjacent to 
and appertains to Papua New Guinea and the area that is adjacent to 
and appertains to Indonesia shall be the straight lines shown on the 
chart annexed to this Agreement commencing at the point of Latitude 
9 degrees 24’ 30" South, Longitude 140 degrees 49’ 30" East (Point 
Bl) and thence connecting the points specified hereunder in the 
sequence so specified:
B2 The point of Latitude 9 degrees 23’ South, Longitude 140 
degrees 52’ East
B3 The point of Latitude 9 degrees 08’ 08" South, Longitude 141 
degrees 01* 10" East referred to in Article 1(c) of this 
Agreement.
ARTICLE 4
The point B3 referred to in Articles 1(c) and 3 of this Agreement 
is the present location of the point of intersection of the meridian of 
Longitude 141 degrees 01’ 10" East with the mean low water line on 
the southern coast of the island of New Guinea (Irian). If the point 
B3 ceases to be the point of such intersection the land boundary 
referred to in Article 1(c) and the seabed boundary referred to in 
Article 3 shall meet and terminate at the point at which the straight 
lines connecting the points MM 14, B3 and B2 shown on the chart 
annexed to this Agreement intersect the mean low water line on the 
southern coast.
ARTICLE 5
For the purpose of this Agreement ’seabed’ includes the subsoil 
thereof, except where the context otherwise requires.
ARTICLE 6
If any single accumulation of liquid (hydrocarbons or natural gas, 
or if any other mineral deposit beneath the seabed, extends across any
lines that are referred to in this Agreement, and the part of such 
accumulation or deposit that is situated, on one side o f the line is 
recoverable in fluid form wholly or in part from the other side of the 
line, the Governments of Australia and Indonesia w ill seek to reach 
agreement on the manner in which the accumulation or deposit shall 
be most effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the 
benefits derived from such exploitation.
ARTICLE 7
O ff the northern and southern coast o f the island of New Guinea 
(Irian) the lateral boundaries of the respective territorial seas and 
exclusive fishing zones shall so far as they extend coincide with the 
seabed boundary lines referred to in Article 3 of this Agreement and 
in Article 4 of the 1971 Seabed Agreement.
ARTICLE 8
1. Vessels or other craft permitted by the laws o f Papua New 
Guinea to navigate on that part o f the Bensbach River flowing 
within Papua New Guinea shall for the purpose of entering or 
leaving the river have a right o f passage through the adjacent 
Indonesian waters.
2. For the purpose o f access to the mouth of the Bensbach River, 
the authorities o f Papua New Guinea and Indonesia shall keep 
open and mark any channel that may be necessary for safe 
navigation.
ARTICLE 9
1. The co-ordinates o f the points specified in this Agreement are 
geographical co-ordinates. The actual location of any points 
or lines referred to in this Agreement which have not yet been 
determined shall be determined by a method to be agreed upon 
by the competent authorities o f the Government of Australia 
and the Government of Indonesia.
2. For the purpose o f paragraph 1 of this Article the competent 
authorities shall be the Director of National Mapping of 
Australia and any person acting with his authority and the 
Chief o f the Co-ordinating Body for National Survey and 
Mapping (Ketua Badan Koordinasi Sun/ey Dan Pemetaan
Nasional) of Indonesia and any person acting with his 
authority.
ARTICLE 10
Any dispute between the Governments of Australia and Indonesia 
arising out of the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement 
shall be settled peacefully in accordance with the procedures 
mentioned in Article 33 of the charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 11
1. This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the
constitutional requirements of each country, and shall enter 
into force on the day on which the Instruments of Ratification 
are exchanged.
2. It is understood that the approval of the House of Assembly of 
Papua New Guinea to this Agreement shall be obtained before 
Australian ratification of the Agreement.
Text in English and Indonesian.
Entry into force: 26 November 1974.
Notification o f succession by Papua New Guinea: 12 September 
1980
Source: ATS 174: No. 26, pp. 1-4.
APPENDIX I I .
BORDER ADMINISTRATION
Agreement between the Government of Australia (acting
on its own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Papua
New Guinea) and the Government of Indonesia concerning 
Administrative Border Arrangements as to the Border
between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, Port Moresby, 13
November 1973
The Government of Australia (on its own behalf and on behalf of 
the Government of Papua New Guinea) and the Government of 
Indonesia
Recalling the Agreement between the Australian and Indonesian 
Governments dated the twelfth day of February 1973 which, among 
other things, demarcates more precisely in certain respects the land 
boundaries on the island of New Guinea (Irian) and delimits territorial 
sea boundaries off the northern and southern coasts of that island
Recognising the need to protect the traditional rights and customs 
of people living in promiximity to the border constituted by those 
boundaries
Recognising also the spirit of co-operation, understanding and 
goodwill that already prevails with regard to the administration of the 
border and border areas and the existing arrangements between 
Governments for liaison and other purposes in relation thereto
Recognising also the desirability of further fostering co- operation, 
goodwill and understanding and further strengthening and improving 
existing arrangements and to this end of formulating a broad 
framework within which the border and border areas shall be 
administered in the future
Having in mind Papua New Guinea becoming an independent 
nation
Recognising also that until independence the border arrangements 
in relation to the Papua New Guinea side of the border will be carried 
into effect by the Government of Papua New Guinea with the 
understanding that after independence Australia shall cease to be 
responsible in respect of such arrangements
As good neighbours and in a spirit of friendship and co- operation.
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
For the purposes of this Agreement the border area on each side of 
the border shall be those areas notified by letters and shown 
approximately on maps to be exchanged on or before the date of the 
exchange of instruments of ratification of this Agreement. The border 
areas may be varied from time to time by an exchange of letters and 
maps after mutual consultations.
ARTICLE 2
Liaison Arrangements
1. The establishment of liaison on matters relating to the border is 
fully accepted. Arrangements should be made for regulating 
the functions and working procedures for each level of liaison.
2. Until otherwise mutually arranged, existing liaison 
arrangements shall continue and liaison meetings shall be held:
(a) by senior officials of the Government of Papua New
Guinea and of the Provincial Government of Irian Jaya 
when requested by either Government on reasonable 
notice, and at least once a year, to review and develop 
border co-operation;
(b) by officials of West Sepik and Western Districts and the
Jayapura, Jayawijaya and Merauke Kabupatens at 
regular intervals but at least every two months; and
(c) by officials of the sub-districts and kecamatans concerned
at regular intervals but at least every two months, the 
location to be locally decided.
3. The main purposes of the liaison arrangements shall be:
(a) to exchange information on all developments in the
border areas which are of mutual interest to the 
Governments;
(b) to devise, amend or establish arrangements to facilitate
the practical operation, particularly at local and district 
levels, of the provisions of this Agreement; and
(c) to ensure that Governments are kept informed of 
developments of significance relating to the border 
areas and that their attention is drawn to any matters 
which may require consultation in accordance with this 
Agreement.
ARTICLE 3
Border Crossing fo r Traditional and Customary Purposes
1. The traditional and customary practices of the peoples, who 
reside in a border area and are citizens of the country 
concerned, of crossing the border for traditional activities such 
as social contacts and ceremonies including marriage, 
gardening and other land usage, collecting, hunting, fishing and 
other usage of waters, and traditional barter trade are recognised 
and shall continue to be respected.
2. Such border crossings based on tradition and custom shall be 
subject to special arrangements, and normal immigration and 
other requirements shall not apply.
3. The special arrangements shall be formulated on the principle 
that such crossings shall be only temporary in character and not 
for the purpose of settlement.
ARTICLE 4
Cross Border Rights to Land and Water
The traditional rights enjoyed by the citizens of one country, who 
reside in its border area, in relation to land in the border area of the 
other country and for purposes such as fishing and other usage of the 
seas or waters in or in the vicinity of the border area of the other 
country, shall be respected and the other country shall permit them to 
exercise those rights on the same conditions as apply to its own 
citizens. These rights shall be exercised by the persons concerned 
without settling permanently on that side of the border unless such 
persons obtain permission to enter the other country for residence in 
accordance with the immigration laws and procedures of that country.
ARTICLE 5
Settlement
It shall be an agreed objective to discourage the constructions of 
villages or other permanent housing within a two kilometer zone on 
each side of the border.
ARTICLE 6
Border Crossing Other Than For Traditional and Customary
Purposes
1. The crossing of the border by persons not coming within Article 
3 above is to take place through designated points of entry and 
in accordance with the normal laws and regulations relating to 
entry.
2. Information shall be exchanged with respect to the migration 
laws and policies operating on each side of the border to 
maintain more effective control of the border areas.
3. Persons who cross the border other than in accordance with the 
practices recognised by Article 3 above or the normal laws and 
regulations relating to entry shall be treated as illegal 
immigrants.
4. In administering its laws and policies relating to the entry of 
persons into its territory across the border, each Government 
shall act in a spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness 
bearing in mind relevant principles of international law and 
established international practices and the importance of 
discouraging the use of border crossing for the purpose of 
evading justice and the use of its territory in a manner 
inconsistent with the preamble or any provision of this 
Agreement. Each Government shall also take into account, 
where appropriate, the desirability of exchanging information 
and holding consultations with the other.
ARTICLE 7
Security
1. In a spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding and so as to 
maintain and strengthen the good neighbourly and friendly 
relations already existing, the Governments on either side of the 
border agree to continue to co- operate with one another in 
order to prevent the use of their respective territories in or in the 
vicinity of their respective border areas for hostile activities 
against the other. To this end, each Government shall maintain 
its own procedures of notification and control.
2. The Governments shall keep each other informed and where 
appropriate consult as to developments in or in the vicinity of 
their respective border areas, which are relevant to their 
security.
ARTICLE 8 
Border Trade
The Governments agree to exchange information concerning 
cross-border trade and when appropriate to consult in relation thereto.
ARTICLE 9
Citizenship
The desirability is recognised of having a regular exchange of 
relevant information regarding laws and regulations on nationality and 
citizenship and each Government agrees, if so requested, to have 
consultations on any problem being encountered in relation thereto.
ARTICLE 10
Quarantine
1. The co-operation already existing in the field of health and 
quarantine, including mutual visits of officials and exchange of
information and periodical reports, shall be continued and 
developed.
2. In the case of an outbreak or spread of an epidemic in a border 
area, quarantine and health restrictions on movement across the 
border may be imposed, notwithstanding Article 3 above.
ARTICLE 11
Navigational Facilities in Boundary Waters
Arrangements shall be made as appropriate in order to facilitate 
navigation of traffic in main waterways in boundary waters, especially 
the "Fly River Bulge".
ARTICLE 12 
Pollution
The Governments agree that when mining, industrial, forestry, 
agricultural or other projects are being carried out in the respective 
border areas the necessary precautionary measures shall be taken to 
prevent serious pollution of rivers flowing across the border. There 
shall be consultations, if so requested, on measures to prevent 
pollution, arising from such activities, of rivers on the other side of the 
border.
ARTICLE 13
Consultations and Review
1. The Governments shall, if so requested, consult on the 
implementation, operation and scope of this Agreement.
2. This Agreement shall be reviewed upon the expiration of five 
years from the date of exchange of the instruments of 
ratification.
ARTICLE 14
Signature and Ratification
1. This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the 
constitutional requirements of each country, and shall enter into 
force on the day on which the instruments of ratification are 
exchanged.
2. It is understood that the concurrence of the Government of 
Papua New Guinea in this Agreement is a condition thereof and 
such concurrence is evidenced by the signing of this Agreement 
on its behalf by Maori Kiki, Minister for Defence and Foreign 
Relations of Papua New Guinea.
Text in English and Indonesian.
Entry into force: 26 November 1974.
Source: ATS 1974: No. 27, pp. 1-4.
APPENDIX I I I .
Basic Agreement between the Government of Papua New 
Guinea and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on 
Border Arrangements, Jakarta, 17 December 1979
THE GOVERNMENT OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
and
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,
NOTING the provisions of the Agreement dated the 13th day of 
November one thousand nine hundred and seventy-three and in 
particular Article 13 which called for a review of the Agreement upon 
the expiration of five years from the date of ratification;
DETERMINED to further foster co-operation, goodwill and 
understanding between the two countries and to co-operate in the 
administration and development of the Border Area for the mutual 
benefit of their peoples.
RECOGNISING the need to replace the said Agreement dated the 
13th day of November one thousand nine hundred and seventy- three 
with a new Agreement;
As good neighbours and in a spirit of friendship and co- operation; 
Have agreed as follovss:-
ART1CLE 1 
The Border Area
1. The Border Area shall consist of the Kecamatan- kecamatan 
Perbatasan within the Republic of Indonesia and the Census 
Divisions within Papua New Guinea, in respect of which the 
border forms part of their boundaries.
2. The Border Area may be varied from time to time by an 
exchange of letters and maps after mutual consultations.
3. For the purpose of implementation of paragraph 1 of this 
Article, the two Governments shall consult and each make the 
necessary arrangements for the mapping, by a mutually agreed 
method, of that part of the Border Area on their respective sides 
of the border.
ARTICLE 2
Joint Border Committee and Consultation
1. There shall be established a Joint Border Committee consisting 
of senior officials of both Governments.
2. The Committee shall formulate guidelines and procedures for 
the effective implementation of this Agreement.
3. Members of the Committee shall, as appropriate, advise and 
make recommendations to their respective Governments on all 
matters, procedures and arrangements relating to the 
implementation of this Agreement and to the development and 
review of border co-operation. The Committee shall meet at 
least once a year, and additionally as and when necessary, upon 
request by either Government. The venue for such meetings 
shall be by rotation in each country.
4. The two Governments may, if required, consult each other 
concerning the implementation and operation of this Article.
ARTICLE 3
Liaison Arrangements
1. To assist the Joint Border Committee, liaison at appropriate 
levels on matters of mutual concern relating to the 
administration of the border shall be established. Arrangements 
shall be made for regulating the functions and working 
procedures for each level of liaison.
2. Unless otherwise agreed, there shall be established:-
(a) a level of primary liaison, as is appropriate in each case, 
between officials from Jakarta and Irian Jaya and 
officials from Port Moresby and the Western and West
Sepik Provinces, meeting at intervals not exceeding 
two months; and
(b) a level of secondary liaison between officials of the 
Kabupaten or Kecamatan in Irian Jaya and their 
counterparts of the Districts in Papua New Guinea.
3. The main purposes of primary level liaison meetings and 
secondary level liaison meetings shall be as follows:-
(a) for primary level liaison meetings:-
(i) to exchange information on all developments in the
Border Area which are of mutual interest to both 
Governments;
(ii) to devise, amend or establish arrangements to facilitate
the practical operation, particularly at local and district 
levels, of the provisions of this Agreement; and
(iii) to ensure that both Governments, through the Joint
Border Committee, are kept informed of developments 
of significance relating to the Border Area and that 
their attention is drawn to any matters which may 
require consultation in accordance with this. 
Agreement;
(b) for secondary level liaison meetings, to consider local
technical or development matters affecting border 
communities, and to implement at the local level, when 
and where necessary, arrangements approved at the 
primary level of liaison.
ARTICLE 4
Border Crossings for Traditional and Customary Purposes
1. The traditional and customary practices of the peoples, who 
reside in the Border Area and are citizens of the country 
concerned, of crossing the border for traditional activities 
within the Border Area, such as social contacts and ceremonies 
including marriage, gardening and other land usage, collecting, 
hunting, fishing and other usage of waters, and customary 
border trade are recognised and shall continue to be respected.
2. Such border crossings based on tradition and custom shall be 
subject to special arrangements, and normal immigration and 
other requirements shall not apply.
3. The special arrangements shall be formulated on the principle 
that such crossings shall be only temporary in character and not 
for the purpose of resettlement.
ARTICLE 5
Cross Border Rights to Land and Water
1. The traditional rights enjoyed by the citizens of one country 
who reside in the Border Area within that country:-
(a) in relation to land in the Border Area within the other
country; or
(b) for the purposes of farming, hunting, fishing or other
usages of land, seas or waters in the Border Area 
within the other country,
(c) shall be respected, and the other country shall permit the
exercise of those rights, subject to its laws and 
regulations, on the same conditions as apply to its own 
citizens.
2. The rights referred to in Paragraph 1 shall be exercised by the 
persons concerned without settling permanently on that side of 
the border unless such persons obtain permission to enter the 
other country for residence in accordance with the immigration 
laws and procedures of that country.
ARTICLE 6
Settlement
It shall be an agreed objective of both Governments to discourage 
the future construction of villages or other permanent dwellings, 
except as approved by either Government, within a five kilometer 
zone on either side of the border.
ARTICLE 7
Border Crossing For Non-Traditional and Non-Customary
Purposes
1. The crossing of the border by persons not falling under the 
provisions of Article 4 of this Agreement is to take place 
through designated points of entry and in accordance with the 
normal laws and regulations relating to entry. Designated 
points of entry shall be as agreed from time to time by an 
Exchange of Letters after consultations.
2. Information shall be exchanged with respect to the migration 
laws and policies operating on each side of the border to 
maintain more effective control of the Border Area.
3. Persons who cross the border other than in accordance with the 
practices recognised by Article 4 of this Agreement or the 
normal laws and regulations relating to entry shall be treated as 
illegal immigrants.
4. In administering its laws and policies relating to the entry of 
persons into its territory across the border, each Government 
shall act in a spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness 
bearing in mind relevant principles of international law and 
established international practices and the importance of 
discouraging the use of border crossing for the purpose of 
evading justice and the use of its territory in a manner 
inconsistent with any provision of this Agreement. Each 
Government shall also take into account, where appropriate, 
the desirability of exchanging information and holding 
consultations with the other.
ARTICLE 8
Security
1. In a spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding and in order to 
maintain and strengthen the existing good neighbourly and 
friendly relations, the two Governments shall continue to 
actively co-operate with one another in order to prevent the use 
of their respective territories in or in the vicinity of the Border 
Area as sanctuary, staging areas, bases or routes for any kind of
hostile or illegal activities against the other. To this end, each 
Government shall maintain its own procedures o f notification 
and control.
2. The two Governments shall keep each other informed and 
where appropriate consult as to developments in or in the 
vicinity of their respective Border Areas, which are relevant to 
their security.
ARTICLE 9
Border Co-operation
In the event of natural disasters or major accidents in the Border 
Area, the two Governments shall establish close contacts with one 
another and shall render all possible assistance, particularly in search 
and rescue operations.
ARTICLE 10
Customary Border Trade
1. The two Governments shall make arrangements to facilitate the 
continuation of customary cross-border trade by the inhabitants 
o f the Border Area.
2. In making such arrangements the two Governments shall be 
mindful o f the following limitations:-
(a) that such arrangements shall only apply to Papua New
Guinea and Indonesian citizens who traditionally live 
in the Border Area; and
(b) that the cross-border trade be of a traditional nature and
conducted in order to satisfy the needs of the people in 
the Border Area; and
(c) that the goods traded are not prohibited by either
Government.
ARTICLE 11
Transport and Communication
The two Governments shall consider, in accordance with the 
normal procedures and practices:-
(a) The continuation of the operation of the existing direct
trans-border telecommunication link for border-liaison 
purposes;
(b) Aeronautical communication between the Air Traffic
Service Units of the two countries relating to 
international flights;
(c) Radio frequency co-ordination crossing trans- border
areas; and
(d) Matters relating to the improvement of communication
system and direct trans-border transport.
ARTICLE 12
Citizenship
The desirability is recognised of having a regular exchange of 
relevant information regarding laws and regulations on nationality and 
citizenship and the two Governments shall, if either so requests, 
consult each other on any problem being encountered in relation 
thereto.
ARTICLE 13 
Quarantine
1. The co-operation already existing in the field of health and 
quarantine, including mutual visits of officials and exchange of 
information and periodical reports, shall be continued and 
developed.
2. In the case of an outbreak or spread of an epidemic in the 
Border Area, quarantine and health restrictions on movement
across the border may be imposed, notwithstanding Article 4 of 
this Agreement.
ARTICLE 14
Navigation and the Provision of Navigational Facilities
1. Nationals of either country or vessels registered in either 
country may navigate freely throughout the boundary waters of 
the Fly River Bulge and the two Governments shall make 
arrangements for the provision of navigational facilities in the 
said waters.
2. Where, for the purposes of a national development project, 
either Government requires a right of transit navigation between 
two points in its territory, through a river in the territory of the 
other country, then the two Governments recognise that such a 
right may be exercised in accordance with terms and conditions 
to be determined by them, according to the individual 
requirements of that project.
ARTICLE 15
Major Development of Natural Resources
1. The two Governments, recognising the need which either 
Government may have to develop, for the benefit of its people 
generally, any naturally occurring resources in an area adjacent 
to, or in close proximity to, the border agree to keep each other 
informed, either by consultation or through their respective 
representatives on the Joint Border Committee, as to particulars 
of such developments or proposed developments.
2. The two Governments further recognise the need which may 
arise from time to time for them to co-operate in order to 
formalise mutually satisfactory arrangements which will assist 
in facilitating the establishment and continued operation of such 
developments in either country, in a manner consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.
3. Having regard to the provisions of this Article, the two 
Governments recognise in particular the Ok Tedi Mining 
Project as being such a major development and agree to consult
as appropriate, at the request of either Government, on any 
matter of concern relating to that development.
4. If any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural 
gas, or if any other mineral deposit on land or subsoil thereof, 
extends across the border, and the parts of such accumulation or 
deposit that is situated on one side of the border is recoverable 
wholly or in part from the other side of the border, the two 
Governments will seek to reach agreement on the manner in 
which the accumulation or deposit shall be most effectively 
exploited and on the equitable sharing of the benefits derived 
from such exploitation.
ARTICLE 16
Protection of the Environment
When mining, industrial, forestry, agricultural or other projects are 
earned out in areas adjacent to, or in close proximity to, the border, 
the Government responsible for such development shall ensure that all 
necessary precautionary measures are taken to prevent or control 
pollution of the environment across the border.
ARTICLE 17
Utilisation and Conservation of Natural Resources
The two Governments shall, as appropriate and at the request of 
either Government, consult each other on matters regarding the 
utilisation and conservation of such natural resources as fresh water 
and forest resources (including wildlife) in areas adjacent to, or in 
close proximity to, the border, with a view to preventing the adverse 
effects which might arise from the exploitation of such resources.
ARTICLE 18
Promotion of the Agreement
The two Governments shall promote amongst their people, 
particularly those in the Border Area, an understanding of the
Agreement in order to develop a stable and harmonious border regime, 
reflecting the good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.
ARTICLE 19
Consultation and Review
1. The two Governments shall, if so required, consult each other 
on the implementation, operation, and scope of this Agreement.
2. This Agreement may be reviewed upon the expiration of each 
five year period beginning from the date of the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification.
3. The members of the Joint Border Committee may make 
recommendations to their respective Governments on any 
matters concerning border arrangements not specifically 
regulated by this Agreement.
ARTICLE 20
Signature and Ratification
1. This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the 
constitutional requirements of each country, and shall enter into 
force on the day on which the instruments of ratification are 
exchanged.
2. On the day this Agreement enters into force, it replaces the 
Agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the 
Government of Australia (acting on its own behalf and on 
behalf of the Government of Papua New Guinea), concerning 
Administrative Border Arrangements as to the border between 
Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, dated the 13th day of 
November one thousand nine hundred and seventy-three.
Text in English and Indonesian: "Both texts being equally 
authentic. In case of different interpretation, the English text shall 
prevail."
Entry into force: 6 February 1980.
APPENDIX IV.
Basic Agreement between the Government of Papua New 
Guinea and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on 
Border Arrangements, Port Moresby, 29 October 1984
The Government of Papua New Guinea and the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia
NOTING the provisions of the Agreement dated the 17th day of 
December one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine and in 
particular Article 19 which called for a review of the Agreement upon 
the expiration of five years from the date of ratification;
DETERMINED to further foster co-operation, goodwill and 
understanding between the two countries;
DETERMINED to further co-operate in the administration and 
development of the Border Area for the mutual benefit of their 
peoples giving due consideration to the traditional rights and customs 
of the people living in the Border Area as already done by both 
Governments (in the past);
RECOGNISING the need to replace the said Agreement dated the 
17th day of December one thousand nine hundred and seventy- nine 
with a new agreement;
As good neighbours and in a spirit of friendship and co- operation 
HAVE AGREED as follows:
ARTICLE 1 
The Border Area
1. The Border Area shall consist of the Census Divisions within 
Papua New Guinea and Kecamatan-Kecamatan Perbatasan 
within the Republic of Indonesia in respect of which the Border 
forms part of their boundaries.
2. The Border Area may be varied from time to time by an 
Exchange of Letters and maps after mutual consultations.
3. For the purposes of implementation ot paragraph 1 of this 
Article, the two Governments shall consult and each make the
necessary arrangements for the survey and demarcation of the 
Boundary and mapping of that part o f the Border Area on their 
respective sides of the Border, by a mutually agreed method.
ARTICLE 2
Joint Border Committee and Consultation
1. There shall be established a Joint Border Committee consisting 
of senior officials of both Governments.
2. The Committee shall formulate guidelines and procedures for 
the effective implementation of this Agreement.
3. Members of the Committee shall, as appropriate, advise and 
make recommendations to their respective Governments on all 
matters, procedures and arrangements relating to the 
implementation of this Agreement and to the development and 
review of border co-operation. The Committee shall meet at 
least once a year, and additionally as and when necessary, upon 
request by either Government. The venue for such meetings 
shall be by rotation in each country.
4. The two Governments may, i f  required, consult each other 
concerning the implementation and operation o f this Article.
ARTICLE 3
Liaison Arrangements
1. To assist the Joint Border Committee there shall be established 
liaison meetings to discuss matters o f mutual concern relating 
to the administration of the Border. Arrangements shall be 
made for regulating functions and working procedures for such 
meetings.
2. The liaison shall comprise officials from Port Moresby, Western 
and West Sepik Provinces and officials from the Province of 
Irian Jaya.
3. The main purpose of the liaison meetings shall be as follows:
(i) to exchange information on all developments in the
Border Area which are of mutual interest to both 
Governments;
(ii) to devise, amend or establish arrangements to facilitate
the practical operations, particularly at local and 
district levels, of the provisions of this Agreement; and
(iii) to ensure that both Governments, through the Joint 
Border Committee, are kept informed of developments 
of significance relating to the Border Area and that 
their attention is drawn to any matters which may 
require consultation in accordance with this 
Agreement.
4. The liaison meetings shall take place as and when required but 
not later than three months intervals.
ARTICLE 4
Border Crossings for Traditional and Customary Purposes
1. Each country shall continue to recognize and permit movement 
across the Border by the traditional inhabitants of the other 
country who reside in the Border Area and are citizens of the 
country concerned for traditional activities within the Border 
Area such as social contacts and ceremonies including 
marriage, gardening, hunting, collecting and other land usage, 
fishing and other usage of waters, and customary border trade.
2. Such movement shall be the subject of special arrangements 
between the two Governments and normal immigration, 
customs, quarantine and health requirements shall not apply.
3. The Special arrangements shall be formulated on the principle 
that such movement across the Border shall only be temporary 
in character and not for the purpose of resettlement.
ARTICLE 5
Exercise of Traditional Rights to Land and Waters in the
Border Area
1. Where the traditional inhabitants of one country who reside in 
the Border Area and are citizens of the country concerned but 
enjoy traditional rights of access to and usage of areas of land 
or waters in the Border Area of the other country that country, 
shall permit the continued exercise of those rights subject to its 
existing laws and regulations on the same conditions as those 
applying to its own citizens.
2. The traditional rights to use land and waters referred to in 
paragraph 1 shall not constitute proprietary rights over the 
same.
3. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall be exercised by the 
persons concerned without settling permanently on that side of 
the Border unless such persons obtain permission to enter the 
other country for residence in accordance with the immigration 
and other laws and or procedures of that country.
ARTICLE 6
Border Crossings by Non-Traditional Inhabitants
1. Crossing of the border by persons not falling under the 
provisions of Article 4 of this Agreement is to take place 
through designated points of entry and in accordance with the 
relevant existing laws and regulations relating to entry. 
Designated points of entry shall be as agreed from time to time 
by an Exchange of Letters after consultations.
2. Information shall be exchanged with respect to the migration 
laws and policies existing on each side of the Border in order to 
maintain more effective control of the Border Area.
3. Persons who cross the Border other than in accordance with 
Article 4 of this Agreement or the relevant laws and regulations 
relating to entry shall be treated as illegal immigrants. The 
preceding sentence does not apply to crossings for purposes as 
agreed upon by both Governments.
4. In administering its laws and policies relating to entry of 
persons into its territory across the Border, each Government 
shall act in a spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness, 
bearing in mind relevant principles of international law and 
established international practices and the importance of 
discouraging the use of border crossing for the purposes of 
evading justice and the use of its territory in a manner 
inconsistent with any provision of this Agreement. Each 
Government shall also take into account, where appropriate, the 
desirability of exchanging information and holding 
consultations with the other.
ARTICLE 7
Security
1. In the spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding and in order 
to maintain and strengthen the existing good neighbourly and 
friendly relations, the two Governments shall continue to 
actively co-operate with one another in order to prevent the use 
of their respective territories in or in the vicinity of the Border 
Area as sanctuary, staging areas, bases or routes for any kind of 
hostile or illegal activities against the other. To this end, each 
Government shall maintain its own procedures of notification 
and control.
2. The two Governments shall keep each other informed and where 
appropriate consult as to developments in or in the vicinity of 
the Border Area, which are relevant to their security.
ARTICLE 8 
Border Co-operation
In the event of natural disasters or major accidents in the Border 
Area, the two Governments shall establish close contacts with one 
another and shall render all possible assistance, particularly in search 
and rescue operations.
ARTICLE 9
Customary Border Trade
1. The two Governments shall make arrangements to facilitate the 
continuation of customary cross-border trade by the inhabitants 
o f the Border Area.
2. In making such arrangements the two Governments shall be 
mindful o f the following limitations:
(a) that such arrangements shall only apply to Papua New
Guinea and Indonesian citizens who traditionally live 
in the Border Area;
(b) that the cross-border trade be of a traditional nature and
conducted in order to satisfy the needs of the people in 
the Border Area; and
(c) that the goods traded are not prohibited by either 
Government.
ARTICLE 10
Transport and Communication
The two Governments shall consider, in accordance with the 
normal procedures and practices:
(a) The continuation of the operation of the existing direct
trans-border telecommunication links for border-liaison 
purposes;
(b) Aeronautical communication between the A ir Traffic
Service Units o f the two countries relating to 
international flights;
(c) Radio frequency co-ordination crossing trans- border
areas; and
(d) Matters relating to the improvement o f communication
systems and direct trans-border transport.
ARTICLE 11
Citizenship
The desirability is recognised of having a regular exchange of 
relevant information regarding laws and regulations on nationality and 
citizenship and the two Governments shall, if either so requests, 
consult each other on any problem being encountered in relation 
thereto.
ARTICLE 12
Quarantine
1. The co-operation already existing in the field of health and 
quarantine, including mutual visits of officials and exchange of 
information and periodical reports, shall be continued and 
developed.
2. In the case of an outbreak or spread of an epidemic in the 
Border Area, quarantine and health restrictions on movement 
across the Border may be imposed, notwithstanding Article 4 of 
this Agreement.
ARTICLE 13
Navigation and the Provision of Navigational Facilities
1. Nationals of either country or vessels registered in either 
country may navigate freely throughout the boundary waters of 
the Fly River Bulge and the two Governments shall make 
arrangements for the provision of navigational facilities in the 
said waters.
2. Where, for the purposes of a national development project, 
either Government requires a right of transit navigation between 
two points in its territory, through a river in the territory of the 
other country, then the two Governments recognise that such a 
right may be exercised in accordance with terms and conditions 
to be determined by them, according to the individual 
requirements of that project.
ARTICLE 14
Exchange of Information on Major Construction
The two Governments shall keep each other informed of any 
proposed major construction such as roads, dams, bridges f t  
aerodromes within a 5 kilometer zone on either side of the Border, 
provided such construction could affect the movement of the people 
from one side of the Border to the other.
ARTICLE 15
Major Development of Natural Resources
1. The two Governments, recognising the need which either 
Government may have to develop, for the benefit of its peop e 
generally, any naturally occurring resources in an area adjacent 
to or in close proximity to the Border agree to keep each other 
informed, either by consultation or through their respective 
representatives on the Joint Border Committee, as to particulars 
of such developments or proposed developments.
2 .
3 .
4 .
The two Governments further recognise the need which may 
arise from time to time for them to co-operate in order to 
formalise mutually satisfactory arrangements which will assist 
in facilitating the establishment and continued operation of such 
developments in either country, in a manner consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.
Having regard to the provisions of this Article the two 
Governments recognise in particular the Ok Tedi ming 
Project as being such a major development and agree to consu 
as appropriate, at the request of either Government, on any 
matter of concern relating to that development.
If any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural 
gas or if any other mineral deposit on land or subsoil thereof, 
extends across the Border, and the parts of such‘ accumulation 
or deposit that is situated on one side of the Border, s 
recoverable wholly or in part from the other side of the Bo , 
the two Governments will seek to reach agreement; ° n “ “  
manner in which the accumulation or deposit shal
effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the benefits 
derived from such exploitation.
ARTICLE 16
Protection of the Environment
When mining, industrial, forestry, agricultural or other projects are 
earned out in areas adjacent to or in close proximity to the Border, the 
Government responsible for such development shall ensure that all 
necessary precautionary measures are taken to prevent or control 
pollution of the environment across the Border.
ARTICLE 17
Utilisation and Conservation of Natural Resources
The two Governments shall, as appropriate and at the request of 
either Government, consult each other on matters regarding the 
utilistion and conservation of such natural resources as fresh water and 
forest resources (including wildlife) in areas adjacent to, or in close 
proximity to the Border, with a view to preventing the adverse effects 
which might arise from the exploitation of such resources.
ARTICLE 18 
Fauna and Flora
Each Government shall use its best endeavour, and shall enhance 
mutual co-operation to protect species of indigenous fauna and flora 
that are or may become threatened with extinction, in and in the 
vicinity of the Border Area.
ARTICLE 19
Compensation
1. Each Government shall pay due compensation for damages 
caused intentionally or otherwise to the other Government for
acts and related activities within its responsibility in the Border 
Area.
2. Damages in the Border Area caused by acts of each other’s 
citizens, except by elements hostile to each other’s country may 
be compensated in accordance with traditional and customary 
practices, under the supervision of both Governments, without 
limiting the right of each Government to consult directly.
ARTICLE 20
Promotion of the Agreement
The two Governments shall promote amongst their people, 
particularly those in the Border Area, an understanding of the 
Agreement in order to develop a stable and harmonious border regime, 
reflecting the good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.
ARTICLE 21
Consultation and Review
1. The two Governments shall, if so required, consult each other 
on the implementation, operation and scope of this Agreement.
2. This Agreement shall be reviewed upon the expiration of a five 
year period, or earlier with the approval of both Governments 
beginning from the date of the exchange of the instruments of 
ratification.
3. The members of the Joint Border Committee may make 
recommendations to their respective Governments on any 
matters concerning border arrangements not specifically 
regulated by this Agreement.
4. Upon receiving of information that an influx of border crossings 
or other border crossings have taken place other than border 
crossings under Articles 4, 5 and 7, the two Governments shall 
consult immediately at liaison level. The two Governments 
shall agree to meet at higher levels if the need arises.
APPENDIX V.
MUTUAL RESPECT, FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION
Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation 
between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the
Republic of Indonesia, Port Moresby, 27 October 1986
The Government of the Independent State of Papua New
Guinea and
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
Mindful of the interests which their countries share as immediate 
neighbours;
Responding to their people’s common desire for peace, progress, 
and prosperity, in accordance with the spirit and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations;
Fully committed to maintaining, renewing, and further 
strengthening the mutual respect, friendship and cooperation which 
have been developing between their two countries in accordance with 
existing agreements, as well as their policies of promoting national 
and regional resilience and independent and constructive neighbourly 
cooperation; and
Conscious of the contributions being made to national
development, regional cooperation, and international order, by the 
United Nations, the Association of South East Asian Nations, and the 
South Pacific Forum;
Solemnly agree to enter into a Treaty of Mutual Respect, 
Friendship and Cooperation which provides as follows:
CHAPTER 1
Guiding Principles
ARTICLE 1
The Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 
and the Republic of Indonesia (referred to hereinafter as the 
"Contracting Parties") shall display and promote respect, friendship,
and cooperation between their two nations, both as means towards 
securing common and national objectives, including regional 
stability, and as valued ends in themselves.
ARTICLE 2
Each Contracting Party shall display and promote respect for the 
other country’s:
national independence, sovereign equality, and territorial 
integrity; and
national identitv, traditions, and values, including the Papua 
New Guinea Constitution, in which Papua New Guinea’s 
National Goals and Directive Principles are contained, the 
Indonesian State Philosophy (PANCASILA) and the 
Indonesian Constitution.
ARTICLE 3
The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to avoid, reduce, and 
contain disputes or conflicts between their nations and settle any 
differences that may arise only by peaceful means.
ARTICLE 4
(1) Should a dispute arise between the Contracting Parties,
they shall endeavour to reach a mutually acceptable 
settlement through direct consultation and negotiation.
(2) I f  consultation and negotiation do not produce a mutually
acceptable settlement to a dispute, the Contracting 
Parties shall endeavour to settle the dispute through 
conciliation, arbitration, adjudication, or such other 
peaceful means as may be agreed.
ARTICLE 5
Nothing in this treaty shall prevent either o f the Contracting 
Parties from seeking to settle any dispute in accordance with the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter.
ARTICLE 6
The Contracting Parties shall consult without delay and at an 
agreed level of representation if either of them believes that a dispute 
which threatens peace or the stability of either country has arisen or is 
likely to arise between them.
ARTICLE 7
The Contracting Parties shall not threaten or use force against 
each other.
CHAPTER 2 
Mutual Respect
ARTICLE 8
(1) Each Contracting Party shall display and promote respect
for the other country’s national interests and policies.
(2) The Contracting Parties shall each respect the other
nation’s right to be free from coercion, external 
interference in internal affairs, and subversion.
ARTICLE 9
(1) The Contracting Parties shall not cooperate with others
in hostile or unlawful acts against the other nation, or 
allow their territory to be used for such acts.
(2) The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to conduct their
respective nation’s affairs in the border region bearing 
in mind the other nation’s interests.
CHAPTER 4
Cooperation
ARTICLE 14
The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to maintain and further 
develop existing programmes of cooperation, and facilitate and 
promote other areas of cooperation.
ARTICLE 15
(1) The Contracting Parties shall facilitate understanding of
each other’s country through exchanges o f experience 
and information, including cultural, social, 
educational, and sports.
(2) The Contracting Parties shall engage in technical 
cooperation through exchanges of experts and 
information, and other agreed forms of mutual 
assistance.
ARTICLE 16
The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to facilitate and promote 
trade and economic relations.
ARTICLE 17
(1) The Contracting Parties shall maintain and endeavour to
strengthen consultation, liaison, and other 
arrangements which provide for orderly administration 
of the common border between their two countries.
(2) The Contracting Parties shall take practical steps to
cooperate in implementing development on and near 
the common border in their mutual interest.
ARTICLE 18
The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to consult with a view to 
promoting regional cooperation, orderly change towards equity in
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